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ABSTRACT 
An essential component of defeating terrorist is targeting their financing and fundraising 
mechanisms.  Successfully targeting terrorist financing may disrupt an organization’s 
existence, prevent an attack, or reduce the harm produced by an attack.  As a result of 
these efforts, al Qaeda faces financial challenges they have not experienced in a decade. 
Whether in response to these efforts, or as a deliberate strategic shift, terrorist 
organizations have been extremely adaptive and creative in adjusting their fundraising 
efforts; specifically turning to criminal enterprises.  While there is still debate regarding 
the level of cooperation between criminal and terrorist organizations, it is generally 
agreed that terrorist organizations and their affiliates are increasingly relying on criminal 
enterprises to fund their operations.   
This thesis will examine whether prostitution is funding terrorism, and if it is 
logical and reasonable to conclude that a highly adaptable terrorist organization would 
fund their operations using prostitution.  Prostitution is a highly profitable business 
requiring no specialized skill set and very little cost to entry.  The business opportunities 
are unlimited, and it is business that law enforcement, prosecutors, and the courts do not 
consider as a serious crime, but rather a harmless vice voluntarily entered into by all 
parties.  A failure to seriously consider prostitution as a funding mechanism demonstrates 
a potentially fatal lack of imagination.     
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The chopper took off at 8:55p.m., circled the field and then headed off 
towards Manhattan. Bill Gavin, the head of the FBI in New York, sat 
opposite Yousef, watching his blindfolded young charge. The Sikorsky 
followed the Hudson River towards the southern tip of Manhattan, and 
rounded the proud towers of the World Trade Center at a height of 600ft. 
Gavin leant forward and eased Yousef’s blindfold away from his eyes. 
‘Look down there,’ he said to Yousef, gesturing towards the twin towers. 
‘They're still standing.’ Yousef squinted and looked out of the window. 
‘They wouldn't be, if I had had enough money and explosives,’ he replied 
defiantly.  (Reeve, 1999, p. 109) 
It is now known that the 1993 World Trade Center attack cost approximately 
$31,000; this money paid for bomb components, apartment rental, locker rental to store 
explosives, phone calls, plane fare, and cab and drivers license fees (Windrem & Haake, 
2008).  During the prosecution of Ramzi Yousef, direct testimony of Secret Service agent 
Brian Parr revealed that Yousef had told him that with more money, he would have put 
sodium cyanide into the bomb, therby creating a chemical weapon (Parachini, 2000, p. 
194).  Yousef also informed agent Parr that the specific date of the attack resulted from 
the fact that they had run out of money and had to act (Parachini, 2000, p. 195).  
B. FINANCING  
Defiance, determination, and more money ultimately led to success.  The 9/11 
Commission report concludes that the terrorist attack that successfully brought the towers 
down cost approximately $500,000; however, the investigation failed to determine the 
source of the money (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
2002).  Is it possible that revenues from prostitution were or could be used to fund such 
acts of terrorism?   
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C. PROSTITUTION 
Deborah Jeane Palfrey, otherwise known as the D.C. Madam, operated her D.C. 
prostitution business from her home in California.  The business operated from 1993 until 
August 2006 under the corporate title Pamela Martin and Associates (United States of 
America, 2007). During that time, the women working for Pamela Martin and Associates 
engaged in prostitution, collecting $250 per hour for their services (Duggan, 2008).  The 
business generated more than two million dollars in income; more than 160 thousand 
dollars per year (United States of America, 2007).  Ms. Palfrey recruited women by 
placing ads in local alternative newspapers and college publications.  The women 
voluntarily came to Palfrey to work, answering the advertisements.  Palfrey generated 
business by placing ads in telephone books and alternative newspapers in the Baltimore-
Washington area.  Among others, Palfrey’s prostitutes included a college professor, Navy 
Officer, legal secretary, and medical researcher (ABC News, 2007).  Counted among 
Palfrey’s clients were current U.S. Senator David Vitter and former Deputy Secretary of 
State Randall Tobias (Duggan, 2008). 
D. FAILURE OF IMAGINATION 
Perhaps the most cited finding of the 9/11 Commission Report is that the attacks 
resulted from a lack of imagination.  On September 20, 2001, in his address to a joint 
session of Congress, President George W. Bush pledged to the American people, “We 
will starve the terrorists of funding . . .” (2001).  This research involves imagination, the 
possibility that revenues generated from prostitution may be or easily could fund terrorist 
in their efforts to destabilize and terrorize our country.   
E. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Following the attacks of 9/11, President Bush stated in The National Security 
Strategy, “The United States will continue to work with our allies to disrupt the financing 




(2002).  Funding terrorism is a multi-faceted operation itself.  Simply stated, however, it 
involves the raising of funds, the movement and storage of funds and finally the 
movement and use of funds.  
Almost nine years after the attack, there is disagreement as to how successful our 
efforts at disrupting terrorist’s fundraising have been.  Some of the steps taken have been 
extremely successful, others have not.  Some of the successes have created new problems 
and challenges.  Economist Lorretta Napoleoni suggests that the within the sphere of 
addressing terrorism, it is terrorist financing that creates the most significant challenge 
(Napoleoni, 2007).  
The challenge lies in the fact that the enemy, in this high stakes game of chess, is 
highly adaptable and skillful at reacting to our efforts to thwart their funding.  The 
enemy’s ability to think several moves beyond our current efforts means we are always 
playing catch-up.  In the United States, prostitution is almost exclusively a criminal 
activity that is to a large extent overlooked as a socially harmless vice, voluntarily 
entered into by all parties.     
Even though it is often overlooked, the problems presented by prostitution are 
very complex and more may ride on the answer to this problem than meets the eye.  
Prostitution may manifest into a homeland security issue that is currently below-the 
radar.  Prostitution is a matter that cannot be simply given to law enforcement, or the 
courts, or social workers to be solved.  It is impossible to determine that any given 
solution will work, and it is unlikely that any solution will eliminate the prostitution 
completely.  The problem is transnational, knowing no jurisdictional boundaries.  
Combine this with a complex array of interrelationships and dwindling resources and this 
results in what Jeff Conklin, Ph.D., describes as a wicked problem (2006). 
Even when our legal and law enforcement systems deal with prostitution, they do 
so in an inconsistent and less than serious manner.  It is a crime that generates large sums 
of money with little risk.  It is the perfect business enterprise. 
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Prostitution is a time tested stalwart, included in a diverse portfolio used by 
virtually every transnational organized crime entity, criminal gang, and drug-trafficking 
organization to fund their operations.  Is it logical or reasonable to conclude that highly 
adaptable terrorist organizations would likewise fund their operations using prostitution?  
Asking this question of local, state, and federal law enforcement officials universally led 
to the answer of we do not know and we are not sure anyone has ever considered or 
seriously looked at the possibility.  According to one senior law enforcement official, 
“The money mechanisms being used to aid terrorism are limited only by your 
imagination” (U.S. Drug Ring Tied to Aid for Hezbollah, 2002).  
Consequently, there is a need for policy makers, intelligence gatherers, and law 
enforcement members to consider what the future of terrorist financing might look like.  
What business models would be attractive because they are able to raise significant funds 
with little risk?  Which business models might take advantage of political and cultural 
blind-spots and allow terrorist fundraising right before our eyes, literally hiding in plain 
sight?  
F. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Is the activity of prostitution a business model that could reasonably and logically 
be used to fund terrorist organizations and operations, be they al Qaeda core, al Qaeda 
affiliates, or al Qaeda inspired homegrown individuals? 
If the business model of prostitution proves reasonably and logically conducive 
and favorable for financing terrorist activities, what steps or policies should be 
implemented to reduce the ability to raise funds from prostitution? 
If it is determined that prostitution is not a homeland security concern but merely 
a criminal concern, are there any policy changes that should be made? 
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G. SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
Terrorist organizations are highly adaptive and innovative.  They study us at least 
as much as we study them.  Since 9/11, reacting to our efforts to strike at their funding, 
they have altered the manner in which they raise funds to support operational, as well as 
logistical needs. 
Have we likewise adapted to their countermoves?  While this is preliminary 
research and will require further study and consideration, it does suggest a below-the-
radar, emergent business model for raising terrorist funds.  Use of this model seemingly 
could exploit blind spots and gaps in our current system; an approach that a creative and 
adaptive enemy could easily exploit.  Rather than relying on reactive measures such as 
freezing assets, identifying prostitution as an emergent fundraising activity will result in a 
preventative, proactive approach to thwarting terrorist financing. 
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II. METHODOLOGY 
The research for this thesis is divided into two components.  The first step 
involved a study of the field of terrorist financing.  Terrorist financing can generally be 
broken down into four areas: raising money, moving money, storing money, and using 
money.  The first part of this thesis focuses on analyzing how funds are raised, looking at 
both pre 9/11 and post-9/11 efforts.  Once a template was established for successful 
fundraising, the focus of the research shifted to an analysis of the business of prostitution. 
Developing a business profile of the enterprise of prostitution in the United States 
created what will serve as the case study. Once a profile of prostitution in the United 
States was developed, a comparison of what makes prostitution work was applied to our 
template of what makes a successful terrorist fund-raising enterprise. 
Overlaying the business of prostitution with the template of terrorist fundraising, a 
coherence theory of truth was applied; namely, that a belief is true when we are able to 
incorporate our observations in a reasonable, logical, and orderly manner.  Is it 
reasonable and logical that prostitution could be used to fund terrorist activities?  If 
indeed this is a reasonable and logical conclusion, then reducing prostitution should be a 
part of our policy. 
Several alternative solutions for reducing the levels of prostitution are presented, 
ultimately leading to a systems policy approach.  
A. LIMITATIONS 
Generally speaking, terrorist financing can be broken down into four distinct 
phases.  The first phase includes raising the funds needed to operate and survive.  The 
second phase involves moving those funds to a destination where they are available for 
use.  The third phase deals with storage of the funds in a manner that makes them 
invisible to detection.  The final phase includes moving them from storage to either 
operational or logistical use.  While all four phases are important, this research is focused 
on the first phase, how the funds are raised and the sources of those funds.  
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Despite much of the research and debate over the nature and extent of the 
criminal-terrorist link, there is still a gap between intelligence and research (Rollins, 
Wyler, & Rosen, 2010).  This gap makes it difficult to predict where and how these 
organizations may turn in the future to raise funds.  But, this gap also presents 
opportunity. 
Likewise, prostitution is a field that provides plenty of challenges to research and 
data collection.  The illicit nature and stigmatization of prostitution make collecting data 
difficult.  Stigmatizing behavior, when it is the subject of study and survey, often leads to 
inflated or marginalized responses (Levitt & Dubner, 2009).  Furthermore, when it is 
collected, it is usually in the context of a rehabilitation center or a shelter; while this does 
not necessarily mean the data is invalid, it does raise questions as to the impartiality of 
any responses or information (Levitt & Dubner, 2009).  Responses may be skewed 
towards what the respondant believes those providing aid or assitance wish to hear. 
Finally, Bales observes that as a result of the controversial nature of prostitution, many 
researchers simply choose less contentious fields of study rather than get mired in the 
political and moral machinations of the issue (2005). Those who do choose to study the 
enterprise are sometimes more susceptible to extremes on either side of the issues, 
resulting in data that may be less reliable (Weitzer, 2005).  
The U.S. State Department asserts that prostitution and trafficking in persons 
(TIP) are inextricably linked.  Most recently, in its 2008 TIP Report to Congress, the 
State Department states, “sex trafficking would not exist without the demand for 
commercial sex flourishing around the world” and that prostitution and any related 
activities “should not be regulated as a legitimate form of work for any human being” 
(U.S. Department of State, 2008).  The United States has adopted a strong position 
against prostitution: 
The United States Government opposes prostitution and any related 
activities, including pimping, pandering, or maintaining brothels as 
contributing to the phenomenon of trafficking in persons, and maintains 
that these activities should not be regulated as a legitimate form of work 
for any human being.  Those who patronize the commercial sex industry 
form a demand which traffickers seek to satisfy.  (U.S. Department of 
State, 2008) 
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Thus, while the position of the U.S. government as stated here is that prostitution 
and sex trafficking are inextricably linked, this study will look at prostitution and not 
necessarily sex-trafficking.  It is possible that some of the cases of prostitution reviewed 
here involve sex-trafficking, some of them may not.  Just as this study will not debate the 
legality or morality of prostitution, is it not concerned with the voluntariness with which 
the actors engaged in the act.  Rather, the central question is this: is prostitution, in all its 
forms, an enterprise that is or could reasonably and logically be funding terrorist 
activities?   
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature reviewed for this thesis can be broken down into two distinct 
inquiries.  The first inquiry studies the growth and development associated with terrorism 
financing, particularly since September 11, 2001.  The second inquiry examines some of 
the characteristics of prostitution, particularly in the United States.  Much of the research 
related to terrorist financing is a direct result of September 11.  While the literature 
suggests a growing reliance on criminal activities, little is focused on prostitution as one 
of those crimes.  As one of the oldest professions, prostitution literature is abundant; 
however, much of that body of work focuses on the morality and legality of prostitution.  
What is notable about the literature in both fields of study is that it almost never seems to 
consider or imagine the possibility that prostitution could be a funding source for 
terrorism. 
A. FINANCING TERRORISM 
When asked how to defeat al Qaeda, Bruce Hoffman continues to include as part 
of a comprehensive strategy the targeting of their financing and fundraising (2010, p. 5).  
This continues to be a common theme within this field of study, namely that vigilance in 
the pursuit of the sources supporting terrorist organizations is an essential component of 
counter-terrorism efforts (Costigan & Gold, 2007, p. 4). Locating sources, tracking 
movement, and limiting resources are beneficial in two respects.  The most obvious 
benefit is that it may prevent an attack or disrupt an organizations existence.  Perhaps less 
obvious, though just as beneficial is that it may reduce the harm and impact of those 
attacks that are not prevented (Biersteker & Eckert, 2008, p. 1).  
While this may seem simple, the current state of al-Qaeda is a highly adaptive, 
flexible, loosely connected network of homegrown, self-funded entities operating under 
the ideological inspiration provided by al Qaeda (Napoleoni, 2007).  Some have referred 
to this business model as the virtual office (Hoffman, 2010, pp. 1–2); however, this does 
not mean that al-Qaeda is impotent or toothless.  As Bruce Hoffman points out and recent 
events still demonstrate, al Qaeda continues to provide inspiration, intelligence, training, 
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and equipment to decentralized networks and franchises operating world-wide (2010, p. 
3).  Napoleoni refers to this as the privatization of terrorist financing (2007, p. 19). 
The ability to determine sources of income and track the movement of this money 
may be one of the most important tools for penetrating terrorist organizations and 
ultimately defeating them.  This is even more important when developing a strategy for 
dealing with al Qaeda, which is not dependent on state sponsorship (Howard, 2007).  
From late 1990s through 2006, al Qaeda relied heavily on donations from 
charitable organizations, as well as wealthy, sympathetic individual Saudi and Arab 
donors (Vardi, 2010).  In addition to charitable organizations and wealthy individuals, 
funding for terrorists has also originated from state sponsors, legitimate businesses, as 
well as criminal enterprises (Shapiro, 2005).  Michael Hess also describes how diaspora 
communities may be participating, both knowingly and unknowingly, in the funding of 
terrorism (Hess, 2007, pp. 52–56). 
Diaspora support of non-governmental and humanitarian agencies are crucial in 
conflict zones where often times the government is unable to provide even basic 
amenities.  As Hess points out, in these complicated situations, humanitarian remittances 
from diaspora communities may also improve circumstances and assist terrorists as well 
(2007, p. 51).  Another dilemma often created in these conflict zones is the collapse of 
the state banking system.  Specialized travel agencies may arise providing banking 
services, filling the vacuum left by collapsed banking system (Hess, 2007, p. 57).  Prime 
examples of this include Kosovo, Serbia-Montenegro, and Bosnia during the 1990s 
(Hess, 2007).  These travel agencies, while serving the legitimate needs of ethnic 
diaspora communities, wereinvolved in large scale money exchange and transfers  (Hess, 
2007).  With such a diversified approach to fundraising, it would seem that terrorists 
would have an unlimited source of revenues.    
Nevertheless, according to Assistant Secretary of Treasury, Terrorist Financing, 
David Cohen, as a result of world-wide crack downs on their finances, al Qaeda today is 
more financially desperate than it has been in a decade (Vardi, 2010).  As stated by Stuart 
Levey, Undersecretary of the Treasury, Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, “They need 
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money, and they are now under financial stress” (Vardi, 2010).  The current financial 
state of al Qaeda is the result of both national and international efforts. 
1. Counterfinancing Efforts   
U.S. counter-financing efforts began September 24, 2001 with Executive Order 
13224 allowing for the freezing of terrorists’ assets.  These efforts have also included the 
enhancement of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA).  The keystone of U.S. money laundering 
efforts traces back to 1970 and is codified at 31 U.S.C. 1051 et seq. and is known as the 
BSA. Prior to 9/11, the focus of the BSA was disrupting the laundering of large sums of 
money generated by drug-trafficking and other financial crimes (Biersteker & Eckert, 
2008, pp. 210–211).  Tools that are a part of the BSA include: requiring financial 
institutions to file currency transaction reports (CTRs) when threshold limits have been 
hit during a cash transaction; requiring the filing of a U.S. Customs Form 4790 (CMIR 
reports), requiring financial institutions to file suspicious activity reports (SARs).  
Following 9/11, and in conjunction with the PATRIOT Act, the CTR and SAR 
requirements expanded to include the full range of money service businesses (MSBs) 
doing business, such as check cashers and other entities wiring money (Biersteker & 
Eckert, 2008, pp. 211, 216).    
Some of the international efforts include United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1373 requiring all 191 member states to suppress the financing of terrorism; 
including the criminalization active and passive support for terrorists prior to an act of 
terror and freezing of assets (Biersteker & Eckert, 2008, p. 236).  Likewise, the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental entity created by the G-7 in 1989 to 
deal with internatiomal money laundering, promulgated “Special Recommendations on 
Terrorist Financing” (Biersteker & Eckert, 2008, pp. 239–240). The FATF have also led 
to the development of seven regional FATFs designated as FSRBs, allowing for sharing 
of successful counter-terrorist financing methods (Biersteker & Eckert, 2008, p. 240).  
Finally, both the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have 
developed plans for countering money laundering and terrorist financing (Biersteker & 
Eckert, 2008, pp. 241–242).   
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Some argue that as a result of various national and international efforts, al Qaeda 
and affiliates have had to further decentralize their financing methods; this has led to self-
financing through criminal activities (Gunaratna, 2008, pp. 57–58).  While many attribute 
this decentralized, networked, franchisee model to counter-terrorism efforts taken by the 
West, Hoffman argues that al-Qaeda leadership realizes that a networked al Qaeda, 
including their fundraising operations, is more of a challenge for the West and that this is 
a deliberately adapted business model (Hoffman, 2010, p. 12). 
Thus, al Qaeda, whether by design or force, is not a monolith; it is neither a strict 
hierarchy nor solely an uncontrollable network of affiliates.  Al Qaeda can be, may 
become, or appear to be, whatever it needs in order to survive.  Thus, while some have 
referred to it as being acephalous, or starfish like (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006), a more 
appropriate reference may be that of a cephalopod or octopus, one of nature’s masters of 
deception and capable of hiding in plain sight.  While hiding in plain sight, al Qaeda 
continues to reach its tentacles across the globe, across every border.  But what does that 
mean for fundraising for the organization? 
2. Criminal Enterprise as Funding Mechanism  
Whether as a responsive reaction to Western efforts or a deliberate strategic shift, 
terrorist organizations have proven extremely adaptive and creative in adjusting their 
fundraising efforts.  It is generally agreed upon that terrorist organizations are 
increasingly turning to criminal activities to fund their needs (Rollins, Wyler, & Rosen, 
2010).  Napoleoni estimates that the bulk, two-thirds of terror financing, is generated 
from criminal activities (2007, p. 14). 
Desperate for funds, and experiencing difficulty in subsidizing the franchisees, the 
global network and affiliates are increasingly relying on crime to fund their operations 
(Vardi, 2010).  Ehrenfeld claims that most terrorist groups incorporate criminal activities 
into their fund raising schemes, arguing that drug trafficking is the largest criminal 
enterprise used by terrorist to raise funds (2007, p. 27).  She also acknowledges that 
funding comes from a vast portfolio of criminal activities, including prostitution rings 
(Ehrenfeld, 2007, p. 28). 
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Furthermore, fundraising is not limited to criminal activities; legitimate 
businesses also serve as fronts to cover for their illegal activities, with cash-and-carry 
businesses being most desirable (Ehrenfeld, 2007, p. 39).  Travel agencies are an example 
of legitimate businesses that may be helping assist in terrorist funding (Hess, 2007, p. 
57).  Another legitimate business enterprise generating large sums of cash, which law 
enforcement recognizes as attractive for money laundering are the taxi businesses 
(Shelley, 2006, p. 208).  
During a Technology, Entertainment and Design (TED) talk, Napoleoni reminds 
the audience of the Irish Republican Army’s use of black taxis to generate funds; as she 
notes, anytime anyone got in a taxi cab, they were funding the IRA (2009). While 
terrorist organizations are increasingly turning to criminal activity for fundraising, there 
is vigorous debate as to the amount of cooperation or the level of “nexus” between 
terrorist entities and criminal organizations. 
3. Crime-Terror Relationship 
Louise Shelley argues that there exists a very strong nexus between crime and 
terror.  According to Shelley, the failure to recognize this relationship is a conceptual 
defect contributing to the failure of our counter terrorism efforts (2006, p. 212).  Shelley 
believes we must do a better job of identifying the existence of intersections and 
interactions between terrorists and criminals. 
Consistent with this argument is the claim that the working relationships between 
terrorists and criminals are much deeper and diverse than originally understood by law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies (Picarelli, 2005, p. 2).  Those supporting this 
position argue that these links are complex and networked, involving a wide range of 
criminal activity raising in excess of a trillion dollars a year in support of terrorist 
activities (Ehrenfeld, 2007).  Napoleoni estimates the dollar volume to be 1.5 trillion 
dollars (2004). 
While there is large support for the existence of this nexus, there are others who 
are not as convinced.  Those questioning this nexus do not argue that terrorists are not 
engaging in criminal behavior, rather they argue that there is a lack of strong empirical 
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evidence that organized crime and terrorist organizations are collaborating in sustained 
and ongoing arrangements (Williams, 2008).  Whether by design or as a result of counter-
terrorism efforts, the result lends itself to, as Williams describes it, a “do-it-yourself” 
organized crime or criminal enterprise model (2008, p. 130).  Currently, Williams sees 
organized crime as an activity available to any entity, criminal, or terrorist for generating 
funds.  Thus whether hierarchical or networked, criminal, or terrorist, an adaptive 
organization may engage in criminal activity when it suits its purpose.   
Perhaps both sides are correct.  As Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Blair 
recently briefed during his Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community: 
Terrorist and insurgents are increasingly turning to crime to generate 
funding and will acquire logistical support from criminals . . . , in part 
because of US and Western success in attacking other sources of funding.  
Terrorists and insurgents prefer to conduct criminal activities themselves; 
when they cannot do so, they turn to outside individuals and criminal 
service providers.  (Blair, 2010) 
Thus, DNI Blair’s testimony is actually consistent with both perspectives.  
Looking forward, DNI Blair warned that this nexus presents continuing dangers.  
Similarly, Shelley argues that we are not paying enough attention to these connections 
(2006). 
Diaspora communities and their financial contributions to terrorist organizations 
is another area that some writers believe is not garnering enough attention.  Nearly 
autonomous, self-funding, home grown terrorist cells conducting attacks in Spain and 
England suggest they may be right (Gunaratna, 2008, p. 56). Virtually every terrorist 
group or network benefits from the moral support, if not the financial support, of 
sympathetic diaspora communities in Europe and North America (Hess, 2007, p. 52). 
While warning not to throw the baby out with the bath water, Michael Hess 
highlights the importance of paying attention to diaspora fundraising supporting terrorist 
organizations (2007).  This is an important admonition as diaspora communities have the 
ability to generate funds from both legal and illegal sources.  Nevertheless, such focus 
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may help prevent specific acts and may minimize the impact of a given event by 
hindering preparations. (Hess, 2007, p. 49).  Even when the sources and intentions of 
diaspora fundraising are legal or well intended, the funds may unwittingly be used or 
funneled to terrorist purposes (Hess, 2007, p. 57).  As with any other source of funding, 
the use of illegal sources is meant to circumvent and avoid exposure to financial 
oversight measures. 
Citing diaspora communities supporting both the Tamil Tigers and Hezbollah, 
Phil Williams notes that criminal activities from diaspora can provide significant funding 
to terrorist organizations (2008, p. 140). Such criminal activities include car theft, credit 
card fraud, and cigarette trafficking.  Royal Canadian Mounted Police have identified 
Tamil street gangs in England and Canada that engage in credit card fraud activities to 
support terrorist enterprises (Williams, 2008, pp. 139–141).      
Referencing the 2004 Madrid train bombing, Hess also highlights the linkage 
between terrorism, crime and diaspora communities.  From his perspective, this confirms 
the possibility that radicalized second and third generation members of diaspora 
communities are potential fundraisers if not flat out terrorist threats (Hess, 2007, p. 60).  
He argues for properly directing law enforcement and intelligence attention at the sources 
and methods of movement related to diaspora based fundraising.  Such attention could be 
a powerful preventative tool (Hess, 2007, p. 62).  The examples provided by Williams 
also argue for such a strategy (2008).  
By evolving into the privatized, homegrown, decentralized business model 
identified by Williams, Napoleoni, Hoffman, and others, these terrorist entities are 
increasingly allowed to pick their targets, strategies, and funding mechanisms (Vardi, 
2010).  The al Qaeda network, whether a franchisee or merely ideologically inspired, are 
encouraged to mix and match methods, approaches, means, and modes to operating and 
fundraising (Hoffman, 2004).      
The most pervasive trend identified as they continue to evolve is the increasing 
involvement and appropriation of criminal enterprises by terrorist organizations.  This 
increased appropriation in criminal activity, leads to a second trend, namely the increased 
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level of cooperation between terrorist organizations and criminal organizations.  Again, 
whether this is most appropriately identified as a nexus or something less may not be as 
important as acknowledging and studying the trend.  According to Williams, the most 
dangerous trend is the transformation from criminal enterprise to terrorist organization, 
most recently demonstrated by the Madrid train bombings (Williams, 2008, p. 143).   
The coordinated Madrid train bombings in 2004 killed 191 individuals and 
injured more than 1500 others (Williams, 2008, p. 126). Spanish investigators determined 
that Jamal Ahmidan and his drug trafficking organization, financed, provided technical 
and logistical expertise, and ultimately carried out this terrorist attack (Williams, 2008, 
pp. 143–145).  There was no outside source of money involved here; the resources for 
this event came from the sale of drugs (Williams, 2008, p. 144). Williams believes that 
the transformation and radicalization from criminal into terrorists increases the capacity 
of terrorists to conduct large scale attacks and mitigates governments counter-financing 
efforts (Williams, 2008, p. 145).  The Madrid bombings, self-funded by drug-trafficking, 
revealed no evidence or financial trail capable of being tracked by financial investigators.  
Nevertheless , in tackling all three of these trends, one of the pillars of our strategy to 
defeat al Qaeda remains the targeting of their financing and fundraising (Hoffman, 2010, 
p. 5). 
This is not to suggest that by attacking terrorists’ financing we will entirely 
eliminate the risk any more than we could ever entirely eliminate an activity such as 
prostitution; however, as Levi writes, it is self-evident that reducing the resources 
available to terrorist, limits the scale of damage they can generate (2008).  Furthermore, 
the more terrorist entities are pushed into criminal activities, the more likely law 
enforcement of intelligence agencies will discover their trail (Levi, 2008, p. 277).      
Consistent with Levi’s and others premise that engaging in criminal activity may 
increase exposure to law enforcement, Picarelli suggests a division of purpose and uses 
for funds depending on the origin of the money.     
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He suggests that the day-to-day funds required for sustainment are more likely to 
come from criminal activity.  The operational funds to support an actual mission are less 
likely to come from criminal activity for fear that mixing criminal activity and 
operational nodes may bring the unwanted eyes of law enforcement, thereby jeopardizing 
the mission (Picarelli, 2005, p. 16).  This concern, related to operational security and the 
need for anonymity is mentioned frequently by those suggesting that terrorist 
organizations and criminal organizations are not inclined to work together or that terrorist 
organizations may be less inclined to engage in criminal behavior to support the cause. 
Picarelli’s concept of separate funding sources, criminal for operating cost and 
non-criminal sources for operational sources, suggests a more hierarchical structure of a 
terrorist organization (Picarelli, 2005).  A more hierarchical structure is also consistent 
with the principal and agent relationship involved in a terrorist organization between 
leadership and financiers (Shapiro, 2005).  This principal-agent relationship creates 
vulnerability for a hierarchical organization in that the agent/financier is able to skim 
funds or deviate from the mission in ways that threaten the organization.  Shapiro also 
believes that financiers in an organization tend to be less ideologically committed to the 
cause.  This in turn supports Picarelli’s observation that terrorist organizations tend to 
separate operating cost/criminal fundraising efforts from those operational/mission 
related fundraising efforts for security purposes.  Thus, for several different reasons, 
financiers and the enterprises they choose for fundraising become a possible vulnerability 
that may be exploited by law enforcement and intelligence communities. 
However, the concepts expressed here may not be applicable to the do-it-yourself 
organized crime that has become an increasingly significant source of terrorist 
fundraising (Williams, 2008, p. 130).  This do-it-yourself organized crime suggested by 
Williams also seems to be more conducive for homegrown or diaspora cells operating 
within the United States (Williams, 2008).  These homegrown cells may not be as 
hierarchical or have the same divisions of labor whereby operators necessarily are 
separate from fundraisers.   
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This suggests that the vulnerabilities created by the principal-agent relationship in 
a more hierarchical organization via fundraising, particularly through crime, might be 
even greater in a more homegrown or local terrorist cell.  This increased risk flows from 
the more direct interaction between leadership and financier (possibly the same person) 
combined with a flatter distribution of duties (O’Neil, 2007).  Another challenge or 
obstacle facing a terrorist organization engaging in criminal activity is the skill level 
required for participation; the greater the skill level required, the greater the likelihood of 
exposure to law enforcement and intelligence agencies (Williams, 2008, p. 138).  
Not only might those raising funds through criminal activity be more visible to 
law enforcement and intelligence efforts, but those actually engaged in financing may 
bring increased risk to the cause if they are less ideologically committed.  For a more 
hierarchical structure, these potential vulnerabilities may cut both ways.  From the 
perspective of the terrorist, a less ideologically committed fundraiser may not care what 
the source of the funds are and not be bothered in the least by engaging in drug 
trafficking, theft, or prostitution.  Also from the perspective of the terrorist, these 
financiers can do the “dirty work” so-to-speak, while the leadership maintains an 
ideologically pure persona. 
As the literature demonstrates, the level of cooperation between criminal and 
terrorist organizations is still an area of much debate.  However, consensus exists that 
terrorist organizations are increasingly turning to criminal activities to financially support 
their efforts.  Furthermore, recent literature and events suggest that cooperation between 
criminal and terrorist organizations may not be necessary.  This may be particularly true 
given the recent increase of homegrown radicalization.  These individuals or small cells 
may be able to fund their own needs through criminal activity.  Self-funding criminal 
activity, if the proper business model is used, allows terrorist organizations to circumvent 
the main obstacle put forward by those who believe that cooperation is unlikely; namely, 
that the alliances and attention brought about by criminal activity would jeopardize the 
operational security of an organization.   
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Finally, it is routinely mentioned that criminal activity, if it is not already the 
major source of terrorist financing, is most definitely trending that way.  Without 
question the drug trade and drug trafficking inevitably are discussed (Ehrenfeld, 2007).  
Drug trafficking also served as the means of funding for the Madrid train bombings in 
2004 (Williams, 2008).  In addition, many researchers reference the following as sources 
of funding:  
• Credit card fraud (Napoleoni, 2007, pp. 17–18),  
• Pirated video CDs (Williams, 2008, p. 137),  
• Counterfeit goods of any kind, baby formula, and cigarette fraud 
(deKieffer, 2008),  
• Diamond and gold trafficking (Farah, 2008, pp. 193–202),  
• Stored value cards (Passas & Maimbo, 2008, pp. 183–184),  
• Robbery (Levi, 2008, p. 275) and human trafficking (Williams, 2008, p. 
139). 
In assessing which of these criminal enterprises may be best suited for their 
fundraising needs, Picarelli suggests that terrorists make their decisions by weighing the 
following criteria:  
1. Capabilities and specialized skills required to engage in enterprise,  
2. Barriers and cost of entering the business, and  
3. Business market and opportunities for the criminal enterprise (Picarelli, 
2005, pp. 8–10). 
The less expertise required for a specific criminal enterprise, the more appealing it 
becomes.  Barriers and cost of entry may include both financial and non-financial 
considerations.  High levels of law enforcement focus and competition from competing 
criminal enterprises, both of which exist in the drug trafficking business, may suggest to 
terrorist financier to engage in another activity.  Finally, what kind of market exists for 
each of the criminal enterprises, how significant is the demand for the product being 
offered (Picarelli, 2005).  
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4. Summary    
Noticeably absent from almost any discussion on the crimes and criminal 
enterprises that are, or could be, utilized for terrorist financing, is prostitution.  In a 
review of international terrorism and transnational crime, the Congressional Research 
Service does not identify prostitution as being in the crime-terrorism toolbox for 
fundraising (Rollins, Wyler, & Rosen, 2010).  In a study looking at terrorist precursor 
crimes, prostitution is not an enterprise that has been identified (O’Neil, 2007).  There is 
no discussion or analysis of prostitution in another study looking at crimes committed by 
terrorist groups (Hamm, 2005).  Is the link not there, or as Louise Shelley might argue, 
are we not seeing it? 
Not only is defeating current funding mechanisms important, but so is predicting 
the next adaptive tack taken by the terrorist as they react to our moves (Napoleoni, 2007, 
pp. 13, 23). Bin Laden has acted as a venture capitalist before, seeking creative, out-of-
the-box thinking and ideas and funding those proposals he finds promising (Hoffman, 
2004, p. 2).  We must be able to predict the next creative idea. 
B. PROSTITUTION RESEARCH 
Prostitution is a business model operating under a simple principle: men want and 
desire more sex than they are able to get for free.  Economically speaking, the behavior is 
a supply of women who, for a price, will meet this demand (Levitt & Dubner, 2009).  
Cognizant of the fact that prostitution is about economics and business principles, 
researcher Kevin Bales recommends economists and business analyst become involved in 
the research in order to successfully disrupt the flow of people, drugs, and guns funding 
international criminal organizations (2005, p. 108). 
Consistent with Bale’s recommendation to use economics as a successful weapon 
against prostitution and joining economists Levitt and Dubner in studying this topic, is 
former investment banker and business executive Siddharth Kara.  Kara’s studies suggest 
that one of the reasons for the proliferation of the sex industry is that those engaged in 
running the business understand that the risk of being prosecuted or convicted is 
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negligible (2009).  Furthermore, even if those profiting from the sex-business are 
convicted, the penalties are not enough to offset the economic benefits (Kara, 2009, p. 
205).  This research is confirmed by Amy O’Neill Richard, who finds the profits are great 
with fewer risks than other crimes because of a significantly lower rate of convictions and 
penalties that are not as severe (Richard, 2000, p. 33).  As a Boston Police Department 
detective commented, a common observation among law enforcement across the country 
is, “Gangs used to sell drugs,” . . . “Now many of them have shifted to selling girls 
because it’s just as lucrative but far less risky” (Urbina, 2009, p. 2). 
Not surprisingly, Kara, much like those studying terrorist financing, suggest 
policies that increase the cost of doing business and reduce the demand of consumers 
(2009).  Extrapolating from his studies, the two most critical recommendations for 
reducing demand is to raise the costs of being caught combined with shortening the 
duration of time that women are engaged in prostitution (Kara, 2009, p. 215). Levitt and 
Dunbar, supporting Kara’s argument, likewise argue that if the government really wanted 
to address prostitution, they would go after the demand.  Their solution, more tongue in 
cheek, is that if men convicted of hiring a prostitute were sentenced to castration, the 
market would contract in a hurry (Levitt & Dubner, 2009, p. 25).  Despite the jocularity, 
they make the same point as Kara; the need to increase the cost of business and the need 
to reduce demand. 
While viewing prostitution through the lens of business and economics may seem 
to provide policy prescriptions, implementation is sometimes more difficult.  For 
example prostitution is routinely viewed through a sociological lens.  Thus it is treated as 
a social problem with all the politics and controversy normally associated with like social 
problems (Bales, 2005, p. 91).  In the United States, politics, economics, and controversy 
generally do not mix well (Levitt & Dubner, 2009).   
1. Individual Entrepreneurs 
Prostitution is a profitable enterprise engaged in by a wide variety of individuals, 
regardless of their socioeconomic level.  Sole-proprietor pimps managing street 
prostitution in Chicago are likely to supplement the income from their “regular” job with 
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the income brought in by managing prostitutes (Levitt & Dubner, 2009, p. 40).  Their 
most important job function appears to be coming to an informal agreement with law 
enforcement; pimps agree to keep prostitution out of sight and in exchange law 
enforcement agrees not to arrest the pimps or the prostitutes (Levitt & Dubner, 2009).  
This may be called corruption by some, and economists identify it as a principal-agent 
problem.  The police chief, as principal wants the laws enforced, but the officer on the 
street, as agent, has other priorities (Levitt & Dubner, 2009, p. 41).  Free from the risk of 
arrest, these sole proprietor pimps report earning $50,000 per year (Levitt & Dubner, 
2009, p. 40).   
Pimps in Las Vegas demonstrate that there is no one way to manage the business.  
For example, one method is the bait-switch-hook pimp.  Looking for women with low 
self-esteem, the pimp recruits and manipulates her into becoming a prostitute.  He sells 
her on a dream and a relationship based on love.  The false dream is that once they have 
made enough money, the two of them, pimp and prostitute can leave that world and live 
their dream.  Then he turns the table, and she is now just part of the stable of women 
prostituting for profit (Farley, 2007, pp. 59–70).   
Another approach is what Farley describes as the long-term groom.  The pimp is 
on the look-out for intelligent women who seem disenfranchised or who seemingly have 
had the deck stacked against them.  He recruits hard working women, managing multiple 
jobs to pay for school while possibly supporting a dependent at home.  He screens out 
women addicted to drugs, alcohol, or who are promiscuous; they create too much of a 
risk.  Empathetic to their situation, he is a big brother, financial consultant, and 
confidante all rolled into one.  He presents them with a business plan, investing their 
money and providing a monthly budget.  In five years, they will earn their degrees, have 
no bills, and money in the bank (Farley, 2007, pp. 70–75).  
The final approach described by Farley in Las Vegas, though transferrable to any 
other city, is that of the trafficker.  This individual flat out buys young vulnerable women.  
He is looking for young women with no appreciable skills whatsoever.  This pimp is 
adept at taking advantage of marginal parent-child relationships and has a keen eye for 
runaways, who are also vulnerable to this form of pimping.  Once bought, the pimp owns 
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them.  For these women, all money collected goes straight to the pimp.  His goal is to 
keep the women in a state of degradation; otherwise they might realize they are human 
beings, and realize the situation is not right (Farley, 2007, pp. 75–84).  Moving up the 
social strata and into another realm of the business, the next stop is the nation’s capital. 
Recall the D.C. Madam, operating her Washington D.C. prostitution business 
from her home in California.  She conducted her business over 13 years generating more 
than two million dollars over that time period; more than 160 thousand dollars per year.  
(United States of America, 2007, p. 5). The women working for the Madam responded 
voluntarily to advertisements in the newspapers.  Once they passed an audition with a 
long time client, they were hired, collecting $250–$300 per hour (Duggan, 2008; United 
States of America, 2007).  Moving up the strata again, we visit an elite escort service 
operating out of New York City. 
Cecil Suwal and Mark Brenner ran the prostitution business known as the 
Emperor’s Club VIP.  This was a high priced escort service that operated between 2004 
and 2008 in New York City.  During this four year period, it is believed their prostitution 
business generated more than one million dollars (United States of America, 2008).  
Clients, including New York Governor Elliot Spitzer, paid anywhere from $1,000 to 
$5,500 per hour for sex with one of the firm’s approximately 50 prostitutes (United States 
of America, 2008; CNN, 2008 ).  The firm serviced clients in New York, Washington 
D.C., Los Angeles, Miami, London, Paris (United States of America, 2008; CNN, 2008).  
More than a million dollars cash was seized from the home of Suwal and Brenner at the 
time of their arrest (CNN, 2008).   
2. Street Gangs 
Money Over Broke Bitches, MOBB for short, is a Seattle gang (Green, 2009a).  
Prosecutors convicted several members of this gang including DeShawn “Cash Money” 
Clark, one of the gang’s pimps, for promoting a human trafficking ring and prostitution 
operation involving girls and young women.  The trial of “Cash Money” provides 
insights into how the MOBB conducted their fundraising enterprise.   
 26
Testimony from a co-defendant indicated that the MOBB looked to recruit girls 
who were insecure; the goal then became to sell them on a dream, “You sweet talk her.  
Just say romantic things like you love her, you care for her, you will be there for her” 
(Green, 2009b). Once these unsuspecting girls and young women buy into this dream, 
“You switch it up on her.  When she gets to the point she feels she can’t live without you, 
you stop the sweet talking and say, ‘You’re going to do this and this and this,’ and she’ll 
do it because she loves you” (Green, 2009b).  Once recruited for their prostitution ring, 
the MOBB kept their girls in line with insults, threats, and violence.  When asked if the 
girls were property or a person, Cash Money’s co-defendant answered “more like 
property” (Green, 2009b). 
In addition to the MOBB, several other street gangs warrant mention.  A recent 
interview with a Minneapolis law enforcement official notes that as Somali street gangs 
continue to evolve, they are increasingly turning to criminal enterprises.  These 
enterprises, generating significant revenues, include prostitution and drug distribution 
(Mulligan, 2009, p. 78).  As to whether or not these Somali gangs, as they continue to 
evolve, represent a threat linked to terrorism, an Ohio law enforcement officer indicated 
they could be a “good or bad thing for [jihadist] recruitment” (Mulligan, 2009, p. 78).   
Mulligan indicated that this same Ohio law enforcement officer suggested that the 
violent energies exhibited by the street gangs could be channeled towards jihad by a 
savvy recruiter (Mulligan, 2009, p. 78).  The gang member is not condemmed, but rather 
treated as someone having temporarily lost their way, with jihad as a honorable means of 
redemption (Mulligan, 2009).  However, the Minneapolis law enforcment officer noted 
that the individuals radicalizing to jihad operated at a higher ideological level than their 
counterparts in the street gangs.  The gang members’ sole interest revolved around 
making money and living like a gangster, thus making recruitment less likely (Mulligan, 
2009, p. 79).    
Minneapolis is not the only city experiencing Somali street gangs’ involvement in 
prostitution.  In San Diego, the Holy Blood Gang (HBG) and the Mission Clique 
diversify their portfolio into multiple criminal enterprises for profit.  These enterprises 
include prostitution, drug, trafficking, resale of baby formula and food stamp fraud 
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(National Drug Intelligence Center, 2009).  More organized and networked than the local 
street gangs, transnational criminal gangs also participate as purveyors of prostitution.  
3. Transnational Criminal Gangs 
Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) is a transnational criminal organization with 
membership in the United States estimated to be between 10,000 and 20,000 gang 
members (Franco, 2008; Bruneau, 2005).  MS-13 is just one of many maras, or criminal 
gangs with ties to Central America.  These criminal gangs, including MS-13, may count 
almost 100,000 members in our hemisphere (Bruneau, 2005, p. 2). MS-13 has members 
in 42 states and the District of Columbia (Gray, 2009).  Some have called it the most 
dangerous gang in America (Campo-Flores, 2005).  One of the defining criminal 
activities that make up part of their portfolio is the prostitution business (Bruneau, 2005).  
Members of MS-13 have been identified as running prostitution operations in Newark, 
New Jersey; Charlotte, North Carolina; and Richmond, Virginia (Castro, 2005). 
Females may join MS-13 through the process of being “sexed-in.”  This entails 
having sex with 13 members of the gang (Castro, 2005).  Once in the gang, as with 
others, they contribute to the success of the gang by engaging in criminal activity.  One 
such activity may include prostitution.   
Another transnational criminal gang in the business of prostitution is the Hells 
Angel Motorcycle Club (HAMC); in addition to operating in the United States, they also 
conduct business throughout Canada.  HAMC, well known for their involvement in 
escort services, are also becoming entrenched in Quebec’s legitimate construction and 
auto businesses (Dawson, 2009, p. 64).  The next business model that finds prostitution 
profitable is transnational organized crime groups.   
4. Transnational Organized Crime 
Albanian organized crime groups are active players in the transnational 
prostitution business.  Also included in their business portfolio is cigarette smuggling and 
drug smuggling.  The Albanians have been identified as one of the sex trade’s dominant 
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forces since 1997 (Gjoni, 2004).  The Italian Anti-Mafia Investigation Directorate (AID) 
confirms Albanian organized crime’s heavy involvement in prostitution.   
AID reports on the close relationship forged by Albanian and Italian organized 
crime groups (Gjoni, 2004).  Not limited to the European continent, Albanian organized 
crime has grabbed control of an overwhelming majority of saunas and massage parlors in 
London, sites used for drug distribution, money laundering, and prostitution (Berry, 
Curtis, Gibbs, Hudson, Karacan, Kollars, & Miro, 2003, 134). Albanian, Russian, and 
Italian organized crime, heavily involved in prostitution in Greece, also are involved in 
trafficking weapons through Greece (Curtis & Karacan, 2002).  Albanian and Italian 
groups are not the only crime syndicates taking advantage of this business model. 
Asian and Chinese crime groups targeting Canada have made prostitution one of 
the fastest growing enterprises of organized crime (Helfand, 2003, p 15).  Within Canada, 
Toronto, and Vancouver act as hubs for these enterprises (Collacott, 2006, p. 21).  The 
close proximity and the over five thousand mile border between the U.S. and Canada 
make it ideal for moving prostitutes between the two countries and into various brothels, 
both to avoid detection, as well as provide customers variety. 
A 2001 raid on San Francisco and Los Angeles brothels discovered an Asian run 
prostitution ring spanning Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, Toronto, and the U.S.; the women 
entered the country using fake documents (Helfand, 2003, p. 18).  Also in 2001, Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) broke up a multi-million dollar prostitution ring 
bringing women into Ontario.  From Canada, on boats via the St. Clair River, women 
entered the U.S. bound for Michigan.  From Michigan, they were dispersed to massage 
parlors across the United States including Los Angeles and New York; more than 1200 
Korean and Chinese women have been moved in this manner (Helfand, 2003, p. 19).    
Production of fake documents, used to cross international borders, is another 
specialty of the Asian and Chinese groups engaged in prostitution.  In addition to 
prostitution, the Big Circle Boys, the most active Chinese organized crime group 
operating in Canada, are also responsible for the largest percentage of fraudulent credit  
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cards in North America and are active with counterfeit software and microchips (Helfand, 
2003, pp. 20–21).  In addition, the Big Circle Boys work well with other crime 
syndicates. 
The Big Circle Boys, in addition to working with other Chinese groups such as 
the United Bamboo Gang, Four Seas Triad, and Wah Ching, also network with Italian 
organized crime, Vietnamese organized crime, and Hells Angels in the prostitution 
business (Helfand, 2003, pp. 26–27).  Taken collectively, these groups are all involved in 
prostitution and have cells operating and conducting business in Hong Kong, New York, 
Boston, Toronto, Chicago, Miami, Houston, Phoenix, Seattle, Los Angeles, San 
Francisco, and Honolulu. 
Within Mexico, it has been reported that the Mexican organized crime group, the 
Titanium Group, has worked with Russian and Ukrainian crime syndicates operating 
prostitution rings (within Mexico). One of these groups is the Solntsevskaya gang, based 
in Moscow (Miro, 2003, p. 29).  Other organized crime groups reported to be working in 
Mexico include Armenian and Albanian; all involved in prostitution, money laundering, 
and document fraud (Miro, 2003, p. 29).   
Russian, Armenian, and Albanian groups have proven expertise in counterfeiting 
documents such as falsified visa applications.  They use those documents to enter the 
U.S.  If they are unable to obtain these documents, the women are smuggled into the 
United States through Mexico.  Once in the U.S., they are forced to work as prostitutes in 
strip clubs, and massage parlors (Brown, 2009, p. 20). 
In 2001, a lucrative Ukrainian ring was broken up; it had been bringing women 
into Los Angles and several other American cities for prostitution purposes (Miro, 2003).  
Others confirm the involvement of Mexican, Russian, Ukrainian, and Japanese organized 
crime trafficking individuals for prostitution into the U.S. via Mexico (Seelke, 2009). 
Mexican criminal organizations have also worked with the Japanese Yakuza 
crime syndicates moving Mexican women to Japan to work as prostitutes (Miro, 2003).  
The Yakuza is one of the worlds largest and most sophisticated organized crime groups; 
prostitution is a part of its business portfoilio (Okamura & Toyama, 2009).  Like the 
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Japanese, Russian organized crime has also been engaged in moving prostitutes from 
west to east, acquiring women from places like Brazil for prostitution throughout Europe 
(Berry et al., 2003).  While many organized crime groups engage in the enterprise of 
prostitution, Russian organized crime almost always enters the discussion. 
5. Criminal or Terrorist? 
One of the leaders of Russian organized crime has been identified as one of the 
most dangerous men in the world; Semion Mogilevich (Pinheiro, 2006, p. 14).  Sourcing 
Russian intelligence, Pinheiro writes of a well-established connection between the 
Russian Mafia and al-Qaeda with Mogilevich being the main point of contact, helping al-
Qaeda get whatever they need (2006).  In a 1999 interview appearing on BBC’s 
Panorama, the interviewer refers to a Russian Ministry of Interior report that identifies 
Mogilevich as one of the top crime bosses in Russia, a finacier running prostitution, 
gambling, and money laundering rings.  During the same interview, referencing a 1995 
FBI report, among Mogilevich’s main enterprises are identified arms dealing, trading 
nuclear material, prostitution, and drug dealing (The Billion Dollar Don, 1999).  
During the 1990s, Mogilevich founded YBM Magnex International, a maker of 
industrial magnets.  YBM Magnex incorporated in Canada, had factories in Hungary and 
Britain and its world headquarters in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  Its stock price rose 
2000 percent as a result of bogus financial records, bribery, and SEC violations.  
Mogilevich cashed out, defrauding investors out of 150 million dollars (Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, 2009b).  During his 1999 Panorama interview, he is asked about his 
dealings with YBM and the tremendus evidence of money laundering that investigators 
uncovered.  His response was, “It’s up to them to prove it.  Unfortunately, I don’t have 
access to the FBI files” (The Billion Dollar Don, 1999).  This interview occurred in 1999 
on the television news show Panorama in England.  Despite the bravado, investigators 
had enough to bring charges.    
In 2003, four years after his interview on BBC’s Panorama, the United States 
indicted Mogilevich for participating in defrauding investors in the stock of YBM 
Magnex International out of 150 million dollars.  Six years after being indicted, the FBI 
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placed Semion Mogilevich on the FBI 10 Most Wanted List.  The annoucment also 
indicated that as bad as the YBM Magnex fraud scam was, Mogilevich’s continuing 
international criminal enterprises, including weapons trafficking, contract murders, and 
prostitution is believed to be much worse (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009b).  The 
following image (Figure 1) is from the annoucement; Mogilevich appears right next to 
bin laden.    
 
Figure 1.   FBI’s Top 10 Most Wanted (From FBI, 2009b) 
Speaking of Mogilevich, FBI Special Agent Peter Kowenhoven states, “With him, 
it’s all about the money and influence.  And the really chilling thing is that he seems 
willing to work with any criminal regardless of  their ideology. . . . Victims don’t mean 




borders” (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009b).  Others have identified him as the 
Boss of Bosses within the Russian Mafia (Glenny, 2008, pp. 72–73).  Mogilevich is not 
the only entrepreneur operating in the criminal-terror world.     
Dawood Ibrahim is an Indian Crime Boss, overseeing a multi-billion dollar vice 
organization covering prostitution, gambling, and drugs.  He is also a terrorist, having 
helped mastermind and fund the 1993 Mumbai bombings which killed 247 individuals 
and injured more than 700.  It is believed that the routes he uses to move people and 
drugs are also used by al Qaeda and bin laden (BBC, 2006; Vardi, 2010).  In 2003, the 
U.S. designated Ibrahim a terrorist supporter; since that time, his whereabouts are not 
known.  Ibrahim and his criminal organization, known as D Company, are known 
collaborators with al Qaeda and Islamic radical group Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) (BBC, 
2006; Vardi, 2010).  LeT is largely thought to be behind the 2008 Mumbai terrorist 
attack, quite possibly with Ibrahim’s assistance (Vardi, 2010).  While believed to be 
operating out of Pakistan, Pakistani authorities deny this claim.  Less famous than 
Dawood Ibrahim is another individual who has utilized prostitution to fund terrorist 
activities, Safe Bourada. 
Safe Bourada founded Ansar al-Fath (Upholders of Islam) in France and had 
plans to attack the Paris Metro, Paris-Orly Airport and the Direction de la Surveillance du 
Territoire (Directorate of Territorial Security) (DST) Headquarters in 2005 (Al-Khiyal, 
2008).  Bourda, Djamel Badaoi, and seven others were convicted of financing and 
associating with a terrorist group (9 Convicted, 2008; New York Times, 2008).  They 
financed their network with a criminal portfolio involving prostitution.  Bourada, a 
French Algerian, had previously been convicted and served eight of a 10-year sentence 
for providing support for bombings conducted by the Algerian Armed Islamic Group 
(GIA) that terrorized France in 1995 (9 Convicted, 2008; Al-Khiyal, 2008).  Thus, similar 
to the Madrid bombers, we see terrorist using criminal behavior to fund their operations.  
In Madrid, the crime was drug-trafficking; in this case, prostituion and petty crime served 
as the funding mechanisms. 
Finally, in addition to Mogolevich, Ibrahim, and Bourada, are reports of the 
Taliban engaging in the sex industry.  As the Taliban came to power, they systematically 
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made women their combat trophies.  Women tell of being forced to marry Taliban 
soldiers, as well as Pakistani and Arab fighters of the Al Qaeda network (McGirk, 2002).  
Many girls were sold to brothels in Pakistan; taken there with the complicity of Pakistani 
border guards (McGirk, 2002).  Still other reports indicate that many of the Taliban took 
women as concubines, while others were sold as sex slaves to wealthy Arabs via the al 
Qaeda network with the monies collected used to fund the cash strapped Taliban 
(Sullivan, 2001).  Reports of these types of incidents are also referenced in the State 
Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (United States State 
Department, 2002).   
Thus, we have a canvas upon which we can see that prostitution is viewed as a 
profitable business all around the world and at every social strata imaginable.  We see 
individual business men in Chicago managing street prostitutes, to individual madams 
managing the women serving Senators and State Department Officials in Washington, 
D.C.  We also see street level gangs like the Somali Hot Boyz, Mission Clique, and Hot 
Blood Gangs in Minneapolis and San Diego, or the MOBB in Seattle.    
Also on the canvas are transnational groups like MS-13, operating prostitution 
rings in Newark, New Jersey; Charlotte, North Carolina; or Richmond, Virginia.  
Transnational organized crime groups from all over the world count prostitution as part 
of their business enterprises.  These organized crime groups include but are not limited 
to: Albanian, Armenian, Chinese, Indian, Italian, Japanese, Mexican, Russian, Serbian, 
Ukrainian, and Vietnamese.  Working with all of these groups in the business is also the 
Hells Angels Motorcycle Club.  
In addition to the profits that exist, there are two other reasons why prostitution 
remains a favorite of all of these groups.  First, as demonstrated by some of those 
discussed above, it requires no special skills to manage and the cost of entry can be very 
minimal, especially with the advent of the Internet, which allows for free advertising.  
Finally, the risk of being caught or prosecuted is minimal and that is what we will explore 
next. 
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6. Cost of Doing Business (Risk of Being Prosecuted) 
While the U.S. probably has the most expansive legal arsenal meant to criminally 
prosecute prostitution, in reality a culture of tolerance exists.  When the laws are enforced 
at all, it is the female prostitute who most often feels the impact of our criminal justice 
system.  In Chicago over a two year period including 2001 and 2002, in Police District 
14, there were 1999 arrests involving prostitution.  Out of the 1999 arrests: 1754 were of 
prostitutes (88 percent); 234 were johns (12 percent); and 11 were of pimps (less than one 
percent) (Hughes, 2005).  Consistent with the data presented by Hughes, other studies 
indicate that the incidence of arrests for johns is 10 percent (Monto, 1999).   
Some might argue that these numbers are reflective of street prostituion, which is 
the least common form of prostitution, and are not applicable to others types or venues.  
That argument seems to be correct.  Murphy and Venkatesh cite a study indicating that 
only 15 percent of all sex workers are working the streets; the other 85 percent ply their 
trade in their homes, at night-clubs, brothels, hotels, and gang houses; soliciation is 
accomplished via the Internet or print advertising (2006, p. 137).  This creates an 
invisibility from law enforcment resulting in significantly lower rates of arrest for those 
engaged in this level of prostitution as opposed to street level prostitution (Murphy & 
Venkatesh, 2006, p. 141).  Referencing the prosecution rates involved with street 
prostitution, which is minimal, the prosecution of those practicing indoors is even more 
remote.    
These numbers are reinforced by Professor Steven Levitt, University of Chicago, 
and Professor Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, Columbia University, who report that the desire 
to punish prostitutes is lacking and it is lacking even more so for the men who frequent 
prostitutes (Levitt, 2009). As Levitt states, “I think society has decided that prostitution is 
not a very grave offense, and it is treated accordingly” (Levitt, 2009, p. 2).  Contesting 
this assertion, law enforcement may point to the more than half a million prostitution 
related arrests that have been made nationwide between 2001 and 2007, approximately 
81,000 per year over that period (Puzzanchera, Adams, & Kang, 2009).  
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Despite the apparent large number of arrests per year, consider the numbers for a 
large city like Chicago, where street prostitutes are arrested only once every 450 tricks 
and only 10 percent of these arrests lead to a prison sentence (Levitt & Dubner, 2009, p. 
41).  Even more importantly, the risk of a pimp being arrested is even more remote.  This 
suggests that prostitution related arrests really are not that significant considering the 
numbers actually engaged in the business.  Furthermore, while we may not consider it a 
very grave offense, we consider it even less so for the men paying for the sex; only one 
john is arrested for every 1200 tricks (Levitt & Dubner, 2009, p. 32).  But perhaps most 
surprising of all is the finding that one in every 30 tricks is a freebie to a police officer in 
return for avoiding arrest (Levitt & Dubner, 2009, pp. 40–41).  While acknowledging this 
study only speaks to Chicago and should not be generalized beyond that, it does suggest 
that a street prostitute is more likely to have sex with an on-duty police officer than be 
arrested by one (Levitt & Dubner, 2009, p. 41). 
While the likelihood of prosecution is minimal in the realm of street prostitution, 
the nature of escort services provided by the likes of the DC Madam are even less likely; 
out of sight and out of mind means no calls from the neighborhood, no nuisance issues, 
and no law enforcement.  Furthermore, from a law enforcement perspective, 
investigating, and prosecuting this level of prostitution is time and money intensive 
(Weitzer, 1999), all of which translates into even fewer prosecutions at this level of 
prostitution.  With little fear of prosecution, buyer and seller are free to do business, but 
they need to find each other. 
7. Prostitution and Advertising in Las Vegas 
In Las Vegas, between print, Yellow Pages, and Internet advertising, it is 
conservatively estimated at least 26 million dollars per year is poured into advertising the 
business of prostitution (Farley, 2007).  This despite the fact that prostitution is illegal in 
Las Vegas.  Nevertheless, according to Senator Mike Schneider, D-Las Vegas, 40,000 
prostitutes and 3000 pimps work the strip in Las Vegas (Ryan, 2009).  The dollar volume 
spent on advertising also speaks to the profitibility of prostitution.  The same kind of  
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advertising can and is done for free on the Internet all around the world.  That is how 
keen the competition is in Las Vegas for these types of services; plenty of business 
opportunity.     
8. Prostitution and Taxi Cabs in Las Vegas 
It is not uncommon for taxi drivers the world over, knowledgeable and successful 
about their business, to know where the best places are for Italian, Chinese, Japanese, or 
Thai, food; or whatever craving the passenger might seek to fulfill. The same goes for 
fulfilling sexual desires, as well; a good taxi-driver will know where to go.  Given the 
competition for business in Las Vegas, as demonstrated by the level of advertising, how 
does a taxi driver decide where to take a passenger seeking to satisfy his sexual needs?  
Taxi drivers are part and parcel of the prostitution business in Las Vegas.  In 2007, it is 
estimated that upwards of 50 million dollars was paid to cab drivers in the form of 
kickbacks for delivering clients to a certain strip club, none of which was reported to the 
IRS (Farley, 2007, pp. 131–134).  Taxi drivers are essential to the prostitution business in 
Las Vegas; they deliver the clients where they are paid to deliver clients. 
Multiple law enforcement sources in Las Vegas have also indicated that Russian 
organized crime is very active in the Las Vegas taxi business (Farley, 2007).  Recall 
Semion Mogilevich’s standing in Russian organized crime and possible links to al Qaeda.  
Also consider his demonstrated ability to conduct sophisticated money laundering 
activities from another continent.  If indeed the terrorist network needs to launder money, 
taxi businesses are a proven method (Shelley, 2006, p. 208).  The IRA has demonstrated 
that a terrorist organization can manipulate this business to benefit their organization 
(Napoleoni, 2009).  These facts, considered together, suggest that further studying this 
connection may have merit in other cities as well.   
C. SUMMARY 
Pamela Martin Associates, working the D.C. crowd, serviced among others a U.S. 
Senator and a State Department Deputy.  The Emperor’s Club, working out of NYC,  
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serviced a former U.S. Attorney and sitting Governor of the State of New York.  In 
Chicago, it is statistically more likely that street prostitutes will have sex with an on-duty 
officer than be arrested by one.   
Returning one more time to each of these cities, we see inappropriate behavior 
from homeland security practitioners.  In 2000, Chicago firefighters stood accused of 
paying for oral sex at a firehouse over several years (Spielman, 2000).  In 2004, New 
York firefighters in the Bronx stood accused of paying for sex at a Bronx firehouse 
(Lueck, 2004). In 2007, Washington D.C. firefighters stood accused of turning one fire 
station into a prostitution house (Kirtz, 2007).  These cases are highlighted not because 
they are the norm, but because they involve homeland security practitioners.  We will 
discuss the impact in the analysis portion of the thesis.       
Analyzing the specific areas of literature reviewed, not surprisingly, among 
criminal organizations of every stripe and sophistication, prostitution is a very common 
enterprise engaged in for revenue and profit making purposes.  This applies to a 
multitude of international organized crime syndicates, as well as transnational and local 
street gangs.  It also appears there is significant evidence and data to suggest that while 
prostitution is illegal in all 50 states, save a few counties, prosecution of the laws is 
limited at best.   
What is also evident is that for the johns and the pimps, prostitution is almost a 
risk free enterprise.  With little risk of prosecution, johns across the entire socioeconomic 
spectrum partake in prostitution in satisfying their needs; no one is immune.  Finally, 
much like the literature review on the financing of terrorist organizations, glaring in its 
absence, is any detailed discussion that prostitution profits could be used to fund 
terrorism.    
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IV. PROSTITUTION AS AN ENTERPRISE TO FUND 
TERRORISM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Virtually every criminal enterprise engages in prostitution.  From individual street 
level pimps to the DC Madam, to street level gang, to transnational gang, to transnational 
organized crime—they all realize the benefits of this business model.  Prostitution is 
highly profitable, requiring no specialized skill set, little to no cost to entry, with 
unlimited opportunity.  The literature indicates that terrorists are increasingly relying 
upon revenues from criminal activity to finance their activities.  While there is some 
disagreement as to the extent or nature of the level of collaboration between criminal 
enterprises and terrorist operations, there is consensus on the fact that both are engaged in 
criminal activities.  Whether the nature of the relationship is a long-term nexus, simply 
cooperation and short-term convenience, or merely the appropriation by terrorists of 
criminal behavior, the common thread is still participation in criminal activity.  As DNI 
Blair recently briefed, terrorists are increasingly generating their funds through criminal 
activity; activity they prefer to conduct themselves (Blair, 2010).  If this is true, why 
would the terrorist eschew prostitution as a fundraising enterprise? 
B. IDEOLOGY NOT AN OBSTACLE    
Ideology is one reason why terrorists would not be likely to engage in criminal 
activity such as prostitution.  Prostitution is behavior that would be anathema to their 
ideological beliefs; however, Islamic ideology is hardly supportive of other criminal 
activities—particularly drug trafficking—yet the terrorists are either able to 
compartmentalize their activities or arrive at other solutions to this challenge. 
From the literature on financing, recall that Shapiro argues that financiers in a 
terrorist organization tend to be less ideologically committed to the cause than the 
members of the group for whom they are raising funds (Shapiro, 2005).  Thus, the 
financier is less likely to be conflicted by the criminal enterprises he engages in and 
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Islamic ideology.  Similarly, Picarelli suggests a bifurcation of fundraising mechanisms 
whereby the operators raise funds from legitimate sources and day to day sustainment 
funds come from criminal activity (2005, p. 16).  Thus, Picarelli’s concept would also 
shield leadership from ideologically unacceptable behavior.  
C. PROSECUTION NOT AN OBSTACLE      
Furthermore, for those concerned with how the appearance of engaging in 
criminal activity may impact on support, prostitution is only marginally prosecuted in the 
U.S. and in many parts of the world not even considered a crime.  These are factors a 
terrorist would consider in conducting the type of risk analysis Picarelli believes terrorists 
engage in prior to deciding which criminal enterprise to enter (2005).  By engaging in 
that analysis, what is readily apparent to a financier is that this is an ideal business model.  
Prostitution is capable of generating high levels of revenue with little apparent risk, or 
even attention from law enforcement.  
A studious enemy observing and concluding that prostitution is viewed as a 
harmless vice and the laws are rarely enforced, might consider this a good fund-raising 
enterprise.  A studious financier could easily conclude that this is a safe, below-the-radar 
business for raising funds anonymously.  If they further observe and understand that even 
when the laws are enforced, rarely is it the pimp who is prosecuted, this business model 
looks even more appealing. 
The video/photo, depicted in Figure 2, played out on WABC in New York on 
November 6, 2008 (WABC, 2008).  In this photo, the governor of New York has just 
learned that he will not be prosecuted for soliciting and arranging for the movement of 
women on multiple occasions from one state to another for the purpose of engaging in 
prostitution.    
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Figure 2.   Governor Spitzer Not Charged (From WABC, 2008) 
Manhattan U.S. Attorney Michael Garcia indicated: 
In light of the policy of the Department of Justice with respect to 
prostitution offenses and the longstanding practice of this office, as well as 
Mr. Spitzer’s acceptance of responsibility for his conduct, we have 
concluded that the public interest would not be further advanced by filing 
criminal charges in this matter.  (Hakim & Rashbaum, 2008) 
The policy referenced in this quote by the Manhattan U.S. Attorney, is from the 
Justice Department’s manual on how U.S. Attorneys are to carry out their duties; it 
advises that unless minors are victims, prosecutions should be limited to commercial 
prostitution activities (Hakim & Rashbaum, 2008).  What this says to someone studying 
the issue is that unless a minor is involved, it is unlikely that a case will be brought 
regarding prostitution.  Between the lines and unspoken, is the fact that there are so many 
cases just like Mr. Spitzer’s that it is rather mundane, and the chances of being 
prosecuted are very slim. 
The U. S. Attorney’s Office did prosecute the head of the Emperor’s Club, Mark 
Brener, who eventually pled guilty to conspiracy charges.  The business shut down 
following the Spitzer incident.  Certainly law enforcement knew what the business was 
all about, all one had to do was visit their Web site.  Consistent with not attracting the 
attention of law enforcement and intelligence, the target audience for a terrorist’s 
prostitution enterprise should not be high profile men.  
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While our federalist system of government is generally regarded as a strength, 
with respect to prostitution, it becomes part of a gap that allows prostitution to flourish.  
In the U.S., criminal law enforcement generally falls under the sovereignty of the states.  
While there certainly are federal criminal statues and the sex-trafficking laws certainly 
fall within the realm of the federal crimes code, prostitution is a crime that in the U.S. 
squarely falls into the realm of state jurisdiction.  This is why we have 50 different crimes 
codes.  As a result, more than 95 percent of all criminal cases are prosecuted by state and 
local governments (National Association of Attorneys General, 2008).  
This dichotomy, especially as it relates to the prosecution of prositution, was 
highlighted during debate over the 2008 reauthorization of the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act (TVPA), specifically a provision in the House Bill that would have 
effectively transformed all prostituion into federal crimes.  In opposition to this specific 
part of the reauthorization were the Department of Justice (Benczkowski, 2007), National 
Association of Attorneys General (National Association of Attorneys General, 2008), 
National District Attorneys Association (Fox, 2008), and the Fraternal Order of Police 
(Canterbury, 2007). 
What they all opposed was an attempt to make a federal offense out of all forms 
of prostitution.  Currently, to attain federal jurisdiction the prostitution must implicate a 
federal interest such as: 
1. The Thirteenth Amendment (slavery), where force, fraud, or coercion 
would be a required element of prostitution;  
2. The movement of prostitutes across state lines; or  
3. The involvment of minors in prostitution.   
One of these three elements triggers federal involvement and those crimes are 
prosecuted federally as human trafficking (Department of Justice, 2008).   
From 2001 to 2007, there were 342 convictions and 1400 victims identified 
related to human trafficking (Department of Justice, 2008).  These numbers apply to all 
forms of human trafficking, not just sex trafficking.  Given the difficulty in proving force, 
fraud, and coercion, the Department of Justice touts these numbers as being highly 
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successful.  Over approximately the same period of time, 809 individuals were convicted 
of transporting prostitutes across state lines (Walsh & Grossman, 2008, p. 5).  These are 
federal prosecutions and do not encompass the vast majority of prostitution related 
offenses which fall under the jurisdicition of state and local governments.  The gap 
created by our federalist system specific to prostitution is that unless force, fraud, 
coercion, or a minor is involved, federal authorties are not going to be involved; as for the 
states, the arrest numbers previously discussed bear witness to the fact that prostitution as 
a crime is not seen as serious crime.  Within this space exists a logical and reasonable 
opportunity to raise funds via prostitution.    
Some in the law enforcement community may take exception with the claim that 
prostitution laws are not enforced or not treated very seriously by state and local 
governments.  Some claim that existing state and local prostitution laws are diligently 
enforced (Walsh & Grossman, 2008, p. 4).  FBI arrest statistics indicate that over the 
seven year period from 2001 to 2007, more than half a million arrests have been made 
involving prostitution; more than 80,000 per year (Puzzanchera, Adams, & Kang, 2009).  
Even so, historically, only 10 percent are johns and, more importantly, from the 
perspective of a financier, even fewer are pimps (Monto, 1999).  Furthermore, when 
looking at the likelihood of arrests as compared with other fundraising criminal activities, 
prostitution is the enterprise least likely to draw the attention of law enforcement.  Table 
1 consolidates arrest information for various crimes that occurred between 2001 and 
2007; the consolidation is that all the numbers have been averaged together for a yearly 
arrest rate per 100,000 citizens.  
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Table 1.   Likelihood of Arrest by Specific Crime (After Puzzanchera, Adams, & 
Kang, 2009) 
Crime Arrests per 100,000 citizens 












Accordingly, it would seem that a studious potential financier, when determining 
what criminal activity would minimize exposure to law enforcement and intelligence 
communities, would come to the conclusion that prostitution affords him or her the 
highest level of security and anonymity.  Likewise, as demonstrated by policing practices 
nationwide, as well as the Elliot Spitzer case, avoiding young girls as prostitutes and high 
profile men as clients further increases the likelihood that neither law enforcement nor 
intelligence communities will pay any attention.  Making this enterprise seem even more 
reasonable as a funding source is the fact that pimps are arrested much less than either 
prostitutes or johns, thereby, making the likelihood of being arrested for prostitution 
almost nil.  Further contributing to the sense of impunity from the law is the manner and 
degree with which the business of prostitution is advertised, discussed in the next section.  
D. UNLIMITED BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY  
Figure 3, consists of solicitations for escorts/women in Las Vegas.  These 
“baseball” cards are handed out along the strip in Las Vegas by the thousands. They 
further add to the total impunity sensed by anyone participating in prostitution as a 
business or considering prostitution as a business.  The cards in Figure 3 were all 
acquired on January 25, 2010 in Las Vegas, Nevada.  A conservative estimate places the 





Figure 3.   Las Vegas Solicitation Cards, January 25, 2010 
In addition to the escort cards, a 2007 review of the Las Vegas Yellow Pages 
indicated 173 pages and almost 1400 advertisements for “entertainment” or “massage,” in 
other words, prostitution (Farley, 2007).  The estimated cost of Yellow Pages advertising 
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is at least 12 million dollars a year (Farley, 2007). Figure 4 is illustrative of the millions 
of newsprint catalogs distributed, advertising full service entertainment.  It is estimated 
that over nine million dollars are spent on advertising in this manner (Farley, 2007). 
 
Figure 4.   Las Vegas Solicitation Catalog Page, January 25, 2010. 
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The sheer volume of money dedicated to advertising, would signal to a financier 
that the bright light of law enforcement is not going to be shining on this type of business.  
Leaving nothing to chance, it has also been estimated that over two million dollars are 
spent on Internet advertising soliciting for entertainment and massage in Las Vegas. 
(Farley, 2007). Thus, between print, Yellow Pages, and Internet advertising, it is 
conservatively estimated at least 26 million dollars a year is poured into advertising the 
business of prostitution (Farley, 2007).   
The postings listed below are further evidence demonstrating the ease of entry 
into the business, as well as absence of fear for prosecution that those engaged in the 
buying and selling of sex sense.  All of the postings were accompanied with photos 
highlighting all the attributes the women were selling.  It also demonstrates the lack of 
any particular specialized skills for entry into the business.  Some of these women will be 
sole proprietors and others will be working with or for someone else.  Similar 
advertisements can be found via the Internet for virtually every city in America.  Unlike 
the cost of big time advertising in Las Vegas, for a terrorist entrepreneur, these 
advertisements cost nothing.  The following solicitations, spelling and slang included, 
were listed in the Pittsburgh City Paper over the periods January 21 to 22 and February 4 
to 5, 2010:   
Let me be our little secret.  I love sexy lingerie and the feel of silk all over 
my 5’ 8’’ 34B-24–34 perfect body.  This will be the most pleasurable 
“GFE” Encounter that you will ever experience.  You will be spellbound 
sweetheart.  I promise you!  I’m waiting baby . . . Let’s go!!!  $300 cash 
Hey boys, Im 27, 5’6’’, 120 lbs, blonde and i have curves like a porn star!! 
i offer FULL companionship, gf. experience, anything goes, just NO 
HITTING!!  I have my own place we can be alone, or i can come to u. i 
am indy so its all 1 on 1, i am D&D free, and expect u to be also.  Please 
only respectful professional gentlemen . . NO WEIRDOS!! I love to 
please and would love to make your dreams a reality!!  I am available to 
meet 24/7 so hit me up i will be waiting for u!! 
Here visiting from Chicago!!  Beauty and brains in one, I’m Sexy 
Squirting Foxxxie.  Your elite GFE courtesan.  Sensual and sophisticated 
with a PSE squirting twist! A hot and wet time, good to the last drop!  Of 
Puerto Rican, black and French descent I’m sure you don’t want to miss.  
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My reviews will blow you away!!  Time with me is always unrushed and 
the ultimate GFE exxxperience!! 200 Diamonds/half hr, 350 
Diamonds/hour.  (Pittsburgh City Paper.com, 2010) 
Most of the solicitations do include pictures and photographs.  GFE stands for girl 
friend experience, meaning the women providing the sexual services will not treat the 
purchaser like just another commodity. D & D stands for drug and disease free.  
Diamonds refers to payment in dollars.  Virtually every city in America has a local 
alternative newspaper—a social newspaper directing people where to go, where to meet, 
and who to meet for everything from coffee to sexual favors.  These papers appear both 
in hard copy, as well as online.  The D.C. Madam advertised in this manner in alternative 
newspapers throughout the Washington D.C. area.  Likewise, Murphy and Venkatesh 
identify the Internet and papers such as these as the manner in which the majority of 
women seem to solict business. (2006). Nationally, CraigsList, despite some 
protestations, continues to advertise such services; generally its postings are more graphic 
than the local postings.   
Unlike the Yellow Pages or some of the advertising materials found in Las Vegas, 
these advertisements are free.  Aside from the time investment of creating the solicitation, 
the cost of placing these advertisements is free.  Finally, consistent with Picarelli’s (2005) 
assessment that an ideal criminal enterprise should provide plenty of opportunity, the 
sheer number of these postings across the country demonstrates that the opportunities are 
endless and they would easily blend in with all of the other entrepreneurs. 
E. HOMELAND SECURITY PRACTITIONERS AND GOVERNMENT 
OFFICIALS 
With endless opportunities, it is not surprising that occasionally homeland 
security practitioners and government officials become clients, helping, as our State 
Department has stated to, “form a demand which traffickers [or terrorist financiers] seek 
to satisfy” (U.S. Department of State, 2008). Recall the police officers in Chicago (Levitt 
& Dubner, 2009), firefighters in Chicago (Spielman, 2000), firefighters in New York 
(Lueck, 2004), governor from New York, (United States of America, 2008), firefighters 
in Washington, D.C. (Kirtz, 2007), and senators and State Department employees also in 
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D.C. (Duggan, 2008).  Regarding this type of behavior, Chicago Fire Commissioner 
James Joyce stated, “It’s a serious breach in the confidence that we enjoy with the public” 
(Spielman, 2000).  This type of breach is even worse when it is condoned by those in 
leadership positions.  As a Chicago Fire Department spokes person indicated, the captain 
knew the woman was in the firehouse, but did not take action to stop what was going on 
(Schmidt, 2000).  In addition to creating demand and creating a serious loss of trust, these 
homeland security practitioners and government employees also created security 
vulnerabilities. 
Remember the FBI’s Top 10 Most Wanted List (Figure 1), pictured right next to 
bin Laden is Semion Mogilevich, the Russian Boss of an organization mixing the 
professionalism of the eastern block intelligence services with weapons smuggling and 
prostitution (Pinheiro, 2006).  Even all the way down to the street level pimp and 
prostitute, intelligence is part of the enterprise.  On the streets of Chicago, in addition to 
taking money for sex, the prostitute also gets paid for “roosting,” serving as a lookout, 
gathering intelligence and warnings concerning law enforcement (Levitt & Dubner, 2009, 
p. 19).  Homeland security practitioners engaging in this behavior create a legitimate 
intelligence and security concern.  Consider the potential value of information that may 
be gathered by prostitutes being guided by intelligence professionals from the former 
eastern block.  Terrorists planning a secondary attack on first responders could certainly 
benefit from knowing who and how those forces might be deployed.   
Thus far, we have been analyzing ways in which prostitution, from street to 
brothel to high end, meets all the criteria of an excellent business model for funding 
terrorism.  The opportunities to get into the business are virtually unlimited.  A smooth 
talking salesman with all the right lines can get into it for almost nothing.  Likewise, a 
DC Madam with a good business sense even has the women calling her to work for her.  
Eighteen and 19-year old street gangsters and independent entrepreneurs to professional 
organized crime members and everything in between participate.  Even the street pimp in 
Chicago, adding a few bucks to his factory job brings in $50,000 (Levitt & Dubner, 2009, 
p. 40).  
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The intent of this research was to determine whether or not prostitution could 
reasonably and logically be used as a funding source for terrorist operations.  I believe 
this research demonstrates that it is plausible and rational to conclude that prostitution 
could be used in funding terrorism; in fact, it would seem illogical if it were not.  While 
the focus has been on prostitution as a source of revenue, simply identifying emergent 
criminal business opportunities is not enough, as attention must be paid to points of 
intersection and interaction between crime and terrorism within the legitimate economy 
(Shelley, 2008, p. 176). 
F. PROSTITUTION AS A FUNDRAISER INTERSECTING WITH 
LEGITIMATE ECONOMY   
The points of intersection Shelley refers to really become ways to place money 
earned through prostitution into the legitimate economy where it can be turned over and 
converted into some other form of value or exchange over and over again to obscure its 
origin and making it appear as though it was derived in some legitimate manner.  As 
discussed in the section on prostitution, the taxi business is one such intersection 
connected to prostitution that provides the opportunity for laundering these funds.   
Consistent with Shelley’s admonition, two other significant nodes surfaced as 
indicators connected to prostituion where these funds could be laundered; both are 
worthy of more attention.  These nodes include travel agencies and diaspora 
communities.  The importance of these indicators depends upon the type and organization 
of the terrorist structures we are studying.   
For a self-funding network relying on criminal activity, such as the Madrid 2004 
bombers, these nodes are less important and may not matter at all.  The money being 
raised is illegal and it is being used to self-fund a cell or operation.  Consequently, like 
the Madrid network, there is no monetary trail to follow.  With no financial trail to follow 
and lack of interest by law enforcment, prositution is an ideal enterprise for a self-funded, 
homegrown network.  Hoffman believes that al-Qaeda leadership realizes that a 
networked AQ, including their fundraising operations, is more of a challenge for the 
West and that this is a deliberately adapted business model 2010, pp. 2, 10).  Terrorist 
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entities are increasingly allowed to pick their targets, strategies, and funding mechanisms 
(Vardi, 2010).  Again, much like the Madrid bombing, this means money does not 
necessarily need to be laundered.  Nonetheless, for terrorist funding requiring 
international movement or involving extremely large sums of money, these two nodes 
may serve as more significant indicators of possible terrorist fundraising.   
Both have been identified as sources of moving money illegally or for illegal 
purposes.  Travel agencies, filling a gap left by collapsed banks in conflict-torn countries 
are capable of moving and exchanging large amounts of money for diaspora communities 
back to the conflict zone.  Within these communities are operating gangs engaged in the 
business of prostitution.  As Hess points out travel agencies may both “knowingly and 
unknowingly” transfer founds to terrorist groups (2007, p. 57).  Other travel agencies 
have been linked to organized-crime and helping women fraudulently gain access into the 
U.S. to work as prostitutes (Helfand, 2003, pp. 17–18).  Thus, operating in the same 
space, indicators are present that certain travel agencies may be vehicles for laundering 
money generated by prostitution.     
Finally, the 2008 Mumbai attacks link LeT, designated terrorist supporter and 
prostitution purveyor Daewood Ibrhim, and recently indicted homegrown co-conspirators 
David Headley and Tahawwur Hussain Rana (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009a; 
Thompson, 2009).  Mr. Rana is a Pakistani born Canadian citizen, who operated a travel 
agency in Chicago.  Among other services provided, the travel agency provided 
immigration assistance to the Pakistani diaspora community living in Chicago 
(Thompson, 2009).  Between 2006 and 2008, Mr. Headley made nine trips to India 
conducting surveillance and reconnaisnce in preparation for the Mumbai attacks.  Mr. 
Rana’s travel agency arranged these trips for Headley and provided his cover story; 
Headley opened First World Immigration Services in India to serve as cover for his 
surveillance (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009a; Page, 2009).  Headley has been 
charged in the 2008 Mumbai attacks and providing material support to LeT.  LeT is also 
believed to have ties to Ibrahim’s D-Company.  While these examples may not be 
determinative, they are certainly illustrative of a possible wider problem worthy of 
further consideration.   
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Another node pointing to multiple possible indicators includes remittances from 
diaspora communities.  To demonstrate this possible indicator, consider the Somali 
diaspora community in the United States.  The Minneapolis law enforcement officer 
interviewed by Mulligan, indicated that the Somali gangs, which originally were confined 
to petty crime and drug trafficking have expanded their enterprises and become as 
proficient as other rival gang groups in the prostitution trade (Mulligan, 2009, p. 78).  
This community is among the poorest, most uneducated, and economically disadvantaged 
diaspora communities in the country (Mulligan, 2009, pp. 39–40).  More than half of the 
population under the age of 25 have not completed high school (Mulligan, 2009, p. 40). 
More than half the population lives in poverty, with a median household income of 
$21,461 (Mulligan, 2009).  Despite this poverty, Somalia still ranked as the fourth most 
remittance dependent nation in the world, with the Somali diaspora remitting almost three 
billion dollars per year (Mulligan, 2009, p. 37).   
Failure to meet remittance obligations can result in dire consequences (Mulligan, 
2009, p. 37).  Furthermore, as the Ohio law enforcement officer interviewed by Mulligan 
remarked, there is some remittance fatigue; given their own poverty, the constant requests 
for money are a begrudgingly tolerated burden (Mulligan, 2009, pp. 37–38).  Attempts 
must be made in all diaspora communities to verify that the proceeds of prostitution or 
any crime are not being laundered through legitimate charities.  Once the remittance is 
made, as Hess points out, some of the money wittingly or unwittingly may end up in the 
hands of terrorist or insurgents (Hess, 2007).   
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V. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. PROSTITUTION AS A FUNDING SOURCE FOR TERRORISM 
This thesis set out to determine if prostitution as a business enterprise is being 
used as a funding mechanism for al-Qadea or any of the affiliated or inspired terrorist 
groups.  It also set out to determine if it is reasonable or logical to conclude that 
prostitution could be used as a funding mechanism for al-Qaeda.  The answer to those 
respective questions is possibly and definitely.  The case of Ansar al-Fath in France 
suggests that a small home-grown French cell used prostitution to fund their operations.  
Furthermore, the case of Daewood Ibrihim, a definite purveyor of prostitution, indicates 
that he funded and masterminded the 1993 Mumbai bombings which killed almost 250 
and wounded another 700 (BBC, 2006). He may also have provided funding for LeT as 
they carried out the 2008 Mumbai attacks which killed at least another 173 and wounded 
more than 300 (Vardi, 2010). Finally, consideration must be given to the case of Semion 
Mogilevich and his connections with prostitution, Russian organized crime, and 
terrorism.  The extent to which money from these prostitution ventures contributed to 
terrorist enterprise is not known.  What is known, is that members of Al-Fath are 
currently in prison for terrorist activity; Ibrihim is most likely hiding out somewhere in 
Pakistan, and Mogilevich is somewhere in Russia on the FBI’s Top 10 Most Wanted List.    
What is also certain is that terrorist organizations are increasingly relying on 
criminal enterprises to fund their activities.  As to which criminal enterprises they may 
choose to enter, Picarelli offers a template for which prostitution is the ideal business 
(2005).  Overlaying this template with the enterprise of prostitution, it becomes clear that 
in fact it is quite reasonable and logical to conclude that prostitution could be used quite 
successfully to fund terror activities.  Adding credence to this conclusion is that virtually 
every other criminal enterprise engages in prostitution.  From individual street level 
pimp, to DC Madam, to street level gang, to transnational gang, to transnational 
organized crime, they all realize the benefits of this business model.  Prostitution is 
highly profitable, requiring no specialized skill set, little to no cost to entry, and has 
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unlimited opportunity.  On top of all that, it is a crime that systemically, law enforcement, 
prosecutors, and courts do not consider a serious crime, rather a harmless vice.  
Accordingly, the system marginally enforces the laws related to prostitution. 
Given all of this, not only is it logical and reasonable to conclude that prostitution 
could be successfully used as a funding source for terrorism; it would seem illogical and 
unreasonable if it were not.  If terrorist are not already using prostitution as a funding 
source or at least studying the possibility of using prostitution to raise money, then they 
may be the only ones not taking advantage of this enterprise.  Thus, having concluded 
that prostitution could reasonably and logically be a funding source for terrorism, than 
what are the best ways to increase the cost of engaging in prostitution, thereby reducing 
the funds that go along with the business? 
B. REDUCING THE RISK 
Napoleoni suggests that terrorism is all about economics (2009).  Consistent with 
that theory, analysis of economists and financial experts recommendations suggests that 
increasing the cost of doing business (prosecuting pimps) and reducing demand 
(prosecuting johns) would be the most effective tools for reducing the enterprise of 
prostitution (Kara, 2009; Levitt & Dubner).  Further analysis of Kara’s work suggests 
that in addition to increasing prosecutions, shortening the duration of time that women 
are engaged in prostitution is most effective at increasing the cost of doing business for 
the prostitution entrepreneur (Kara, 2009, p. 215). 
The problems presented by prostitution are very complex; it is a matter that 
cannot be simply given to law enforcement, or the courts, or social workers to be solved.  
It is impossible to determine that any given solution will work and it is unlikely that any 
solution will eliminate the prostitution completely.  The problem is transnational, 
knowing no jurisdictional boundaries and combining complex social and psychological 
behaviors and interactions.  This challenge requires consideration of the systems involved 
in addition to personal dispositions and situational forces (Zimbardo, 2007, p. 10). 
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While there are plenty of examples, let us consider the homeland security 
practitioners and government leaders referenced in this paper who have solicited 
prostitutes to help explain Zimbardo’s sytems philosophy.  Zimbardo notes that when 
service professionals, such as policemen, firemen, senators, or govenours enage in 
criminal, immoral or aberrant behavior we label them as a few bad apples.  This is the 
dispositional view of behavior; the impermeable line seperating good from evil 
(Zimbardo, 2007). 
Homeland security and law enforcement would be easy if there truly existed 
people who were only evil; we would simply eliminate them.  But this is not the case.  
Good and evil resides in each and every one of us; this concept goes back to the 
beginning of man (Zimbardo, 2007).  This dispositional approach fails to take into 
account what it was about the apple barrel, what situations and circumstances impacted 
upon the police officers, firefighters, and politicians that made them enage in that 
behavior (Zimbardo, 2007).  Behavior that Zimbardo teaches us we can all be susceptible 
to when caught up in the crucible of every day life (Zimbardo, 2007, p. 211).  But even 
this is not sufficient to explain what drives individuals to do things that are harmful to 
themselves or others. 
It is systems, in the case of prostitution, the criminal justice, law enforcment, and 
judicial systems that  help create the situations wherby  public servants referenced here 
afoul.  Systems authorize and institutionalize permission to behave in certain ways follow 
certain rules and not enforce others.  It is a systems analysis of human behavior that 
explains a lot of the behaviors and choices associated with everyone involved in the 
prostitution enterprise.  Why do ordinary people get transformed into intentionally 
engaging in treating other human beings as property, demeaning, dehumanizing, and 
harming other human beings?  Why do ordinary people get transformed into voluntarily 
submitting themselves to being treated as property or dehumanized? 
Zimbardo’s “Ten Lessons from the Milgram Studies: Creating Evil Traps for 
Good People,” offers some of the clearest insights into why some individuals engage in 
these behaviors and the transformative behaviors they engage in that allow them to 
continue (Zimbardo, 2007, pp. 273–275).  Zimbardo discusses prearranging some form of 
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contractual obligation; the D.C. Madam claimed that the women she contracted with 
agreed not to engage in only illegal sexual activity with clients, intercourse, or oral sex 
(ABC News, 2007).  This was the Madam attempting to diffuse her liability (Zimbardo, 
2007).  Consistent with giving participants meaningful roles, we see the prevalence and 
premium paid for the GFE (girl friend experience) in the on-line advertising.  We see 
what Zimbardo calls the deindividuation or anonymity of the participants; purchasers of 
sex are “johns” who do not use their real names or the D.C. Madam and her “employees” 
who all used pseudonyms (ABC News, 2007; Zimbardo, 2007, p. 298). 
Other traps for good people are replacing unpleasant reality with desirable 
rhetoric, as well as offering acceptable justification to achieve a desirable goal 
(Zimbardo, 2007, pp. 273–274).  The D.C. Madam stated, “I think I ran a very nice 
operation. . . . I think I empowered a lot of women. I got a lot of women through graduate 
school.  I think the people that used the service were by and large quite pleased” (ABC 
News, 2007).    
Likewise Zimbardo (2007) points out that, the use of drugs, alcohol, or even the 
high/thrill from engaging in such behavior creates a super-charged present time focus that 
leads to a suspension of self-monitoring and regulation increasing the likelihood of 
violence or evil (Zimbardo, 2007, p. 305). All of these scenarios are seen regularly in 
prostitution.  Citing work done by Albert Bandura, Zimardo (2007) explains how a single 
dehumanizing word, “animal” led otherwise “good” people to treat others as if they 
deserved to be harmed.  This helps explain why those labeled “slut” or “crack whore,” or 
even just “hooker” become the frequent targets of violence.  Bandura’s work also helps 
explain the violence against prostitutes, in that those who are violent with the “crack 
whore” will become more violent over time (Zimbardo, 2007, pp. 17–18, 308–310).  
As we have seen from Levitt and Kara, they believe that attacking the demand is 
the most effective way to reduce prostitution and or trafficking.  If it is reasonable or 
logical that prostitution could be used as a mechanism to fund terrorism, then reducing 
the amount of prostitution requires attacking the problem at the systemic, situational, and 




behaviors are systemic forces (2007). Systemic forces further drive situational forces that 
ultimately lead to undesirable actions.  Beginning at the systemic level, it is the criminal 
justice and legal systems we need to address.   
Prostitution is illegal in all 50 states, save for a few counties. A review of criminal 
codes indicates that there are collectively, more than 200 state and federal laws on the 
books. As previously demonstrated, the extent to which those laws are enforced against 
anyone is haphazard and minimal at best.  Therefore, the first part of systemic change is 
enforcement of the law.  Secondly, when the law is enforced, it needs enforced fairly and 
equitably.  These systems must decide to change the way they are doing business, 
otherwise they are institutionalizing and authorizing the type of behavior exhibited by the 
governor of New York, as well as the business of prostitution.    
Devon Brewer and colleagues have presented evidence suggesting that arresting 
clients (merely arresting them and enforcing the law) substantially decreased patronizing 
behavior.  Arresting clients, the johns reduced the likelihood of recidivism by 70 percent 
(Brewer, Potterat, Muth, Roberts, Dudek, & Woodhouse, 2007).  The authors of this 
study suggest that arrest may be a significant deterrent because the clients are otherwise 
law-abiding men (Brewer et al., 2007, p. 13).  Changing the system deterred otherwise 
good men from engaging in harmful behavior.   
If we are to seriously reduce demand, we need to enforce the law and do so fairly 
by arresting and prosecuting the johns and pimps at least as much as we do the 
prostitutes.  Doing so is consistent with Kara’s concept of increasing the risk of being 
caught, thereby increasing the cost of doing business for the financier (2009). By 
enforcing the laws and enforcing them equally and fairly, the system allows for 
conditions that lead to situational changes. 
The situational change is accomplished by enforcing the laws within the 
framework of enforcing them equally and fairly, and enforcing the laws within the 
concept of a specialized court system; special “Prostitution” Courts.  Two examples of 
these courts in action are found in Pittsburgh and Dallas.  In Pittsburgh, the legal, 
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judicial, and law enforcement system operates the Program for Re-Integration, 
Development, and Empowerment Court (PRIDE) (Banks, 2006).  In Dallas, the system 
operates the Strengthening, Transition, and Recovery Court (STAR) (Feldman, 2010).  
The PRIDE and STAR Courts are examples of programs that help prostitutes who want a 
different life and are willing to work for it.   
These courts combine the court systems ability to punish with social services 
ability to rehabilitate.  The system has developed an exit strategy for the prostitutes; 
handing down alternative sentences (not jail time) and making available to them medical, 
psychological, treatment, and job training, whatever they might require (Feldman, 2010, 
p. 2).  These courts are a sea change in the way the justice system views prostitutes 
(Feldman, 2010).  These courts are consistent with Kara’s concept of reducing the 
duration women are in the business, thereby increasing the cost of doing business for the 
terrorist finacnier.   
In Pittsburgh, over the five year period the court has been in existence, for women 
who successfully complete the program, the recidivism rate is just five percent (Feldman, 
2010, p. 6).  In Dallas, over the first two years, the recidivism rate is 10 percent 
(Feldman, 2010).  These programs, as successful as they are, would not be possible 
without systemic changes in attitudes and operations.  Finally, having suggested systemic 
and situational approaches to increasing the cost of engaging in prostitution, several 
individual approaches deserve mention. 
In San Francisco, the First Offender Prostitution Program (FOPP) is designed and 
targeted at reducing demand for prostitution by educating men arrested for soliciting 
prostitutes about the harmful consequences of prostitution.  The FOPP curriculum 
includes: the legal consequences of a subsequent arrest and vulnerability of being robbed 
while involved in prostitution; description of the increased risk of HIV and STD infection 
and possible negative long-term health effects; negative consequences for women serving 
as prostitutes; dynamics of pimping, recruiting, and trafficking, as well as links between 
prostitution and trafficking; negative impact on the community; and whether or not 
participation in prostitution is driven by a sex addiction and where to seek treatment.  
(Shively, Jalbert, Kling, Rhodes, Finn, Flygar et al., 2008).  
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The FOPP program is the result of collaboration between the San Francisco 
District Attorney’s Office (SFDA), the San Francisco Police Department (SFPD), and the 
non-profit organization, Standing Against Global Exploitation (SAGE).  Arrestees are 
given the choice of paying a fee and attending the one-day FOPP class or being 
prosecuted.  The fees support the cost of the FOPP classes, subsidizes police vice 
operations, and recovery programs for prostitutes (Shively et al., 2008).       
Criminologist Michael Shively has studied this program for two years and 
concluded that FOPP significantly reduced recidivism among men arrested for soliciting 
prostitutes.  It is possible this effect is a result of merely arresting the johns, but the two 
go hand in hand.  They do not participate in FOPP until they have been arrested.  
Furthermore, as Shively has reported, the program has operated for 12 years at no cost to 
taxpayers and generated more than a million dollars for support and recovery of women 
wishing to quit prostitution. (2008). Shively also concluded that the program is highly 
transferrable to other cities across the country (2008).  In conjunction with their PRIDE 
and STAR courts, Pittsburgh and Dallas also run programs similar to FOPP.      
Dallas also runs an innovative program aimed at preventing runaways from 
entering prostitution and helping them get out of prostitution if involved (Urbina, 2009).  
Urbina reports that nearly a third of minors who runaway engage in sex for food and 
shelter, which easily leads into prostitution.  In 2005, Sergeant Byron Fassett created the 
“High Risk Victim” unit in Dallas, Texas; the challenge was to prevent young runaway 
girls from becoming prostitutes (Urbina, 2009). Part of the problem was that law 
enforcement did not view this as a crime but rather a nuisance and prosecutors refused 
cases against pimps because the girls made poor witnesses and unsympathetic witnesses 
(Urbina, 2009).  Fassett realized the system was broken.   
Reviewing old cases, a pattern emerged; Fassett discovered that 80 percent of the 
minors being prostituted had run away at least four times (Urbina, 2009, p. 5).  His 
program aims to intervene before an individual runs away for the fourth time.  If a Dallas 
juvenile runaway is picked up anywhere in the country, they are sent back to Fassett’s 
unit (Urbina, 2009, p. 5).  The impact of intervening at this stage is that 75 percent of the 
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minors they reach get whatever help they need and do not return to prostitution.  
Furthermore, more than nine out of 10 pimps arrested in these cases are convicted 
(Urbina, 2009, p. 6).   
Thus, Fassett fixed the system, changed the girls’ situation, and helped them 
individually.  This program increases the cost of engaging in prostitution as an enterprise, 
as well as shortening the duration young girls engage in prostitution or even prevent them 
from entering in the first place.  While a smart financier would avoid the young girls in 
the first place, once the young girl becomes involved in prostitution, child welfare 
workers and law enforcement officials indicate it becomes very hard to escape (Urbina, 
2009, p. 1).  
This program has been so successful at stopping runaways from entering 
prostitution and helping them escape from prostitution, that Congress proposed 55 
million dollars in the 2007 federal budget to run pilots in other cities around the country; 
this money did not make it through the budgetary process (Urbina, 2009).  This concept 
needs to be revisited, piloted and studied to further determine its efficacy. 
C. WHAT IF PROSTITUTION IS NOT A HOMELAND SECURITY ISSUE?  
What if it is determined that prostitution is not a homeland security threat, but 
merely a criminal concern?  Should the policies discussed above still be implemented?  
The most effective homeland security measures are ones that provide derivative benefits 
to other private and public sectors (Flynn, 2005, p. 168).  The systems policy approach 
introduced here, reducing demand for prostitution by increasing the risk and cost of being 
prosecuted, combined with shortening the duration or preventing altogether women from 
entering prostitution, increases the cost to the finacnier looking to get into the business.   
If however, prostitution is merely a criminal concern, these policies should 
nevertheless be implemented.  They do provide derivative benefits to the public at large.  
The high risk victim unit in Dallas does rescue and prevent young girls from becoming 
prostitutes.  It does provide health and social services that these individuals would not 
otherwise get.  Likewise, the PRIDE court in Pittsburgh and the STAR court in Dallas 
provide an exit strategy and all the resources needed for women who want a different life 
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and are willing to work for it but need a hand.  The legal, judicial, and law enforcement 
systems prosecuting the johns impacts the system tremendously; arresting the johns 
provides a significant deterrent (Brewer et al., 2007, p. 13).  The FOPP program, as well 
as the PRIDE and STAR, courts are also a more efficient use of legal and judical resources, 
not requiring costly incarcerations; though some will appropriately require incarceration.    
Finally, there is a benefit when the laws of a nation are enforced and enforced fairly.  
Sometimes, the benefits may not be immediately noticeable, For example, reflect for a 
moment on pro-al Qaeda Yemeni Cleric Anwar al-Awlaki.  He first came to the FBI’s 
attention in 1999, for possible links to convicted terrorist Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman.  
Downplaying any link, the FBI terminated their investigation and interest of al-Awlaki in 
2000 (Ragavan, 2004).   
Following 9/11, investigators again became interested in al-Awlaki; linking him to at 
least four involved in the 9/11 plot, including three who crashed into the Pentagon.  FBI 
investigators discovered that he had twice been arrested in San Diego for soliciting 
prostitutes in 1996 and 1997 but did no jail time on either occasion (Ghosh, 2010; Ragavan, 
2004).  In 2002, al-Awlaki lived in Falls Church, Virginia.  Now, hoping to detain him on 
something, FBI agents observed al-Awlaki taking Washington D.C. area prostitutes into 
Virginia.  They contemplated arresting him using the Mann Act for transporting prostitutes 
across state lines (Ragavan, 2004).  Before they could do that, al-Awlaki left the country in 
March 2002. 
In addition to four of the 9/11 plotters, al-Awlaki has been directly linked or inspired 
through his preaching and e-mails Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, Major Nidal Milik 
Hassan, Michael Finton, four of the 2005 London Underground bombers, and al-Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula leader, Nasser al-Wuhaysi (Ghosh, 2010).  There are most 
certainly others.  A missile attack on al-Awlaki’s home on Christmas Eve 2009 failed its 
intended effect (Ghosh, 2010).  Currently, al-Awlaki is an individual that U.S. counter-
terrorism officials in our government would like to see dead (Ghosh, 2010).  In all 
likelihood, he is the focus of spy satellites and predator drones (Ghosh, 2010).  Perhaps 
had we treated prostitution as more than a harmless vice, al-Awlaki would not be the rock 
star motivator of radical Islam that he is today. 
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